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The Age of Innocence: The First 25 
Years of The National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931 
W. Burlette Carter* 
In 2006, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), 
the most powerful body in intercollegiate athletics, celebrates its 100th 
anniversary.  In this article, the author undertakes to survey the 
NCAA’s first twenty five years,1 offering a revealing snapshot of the 
beginning of intercollegiate athletics in the United States.  As with the 
author’s prior articles on this subject, this article continues the unique 
approach of using the proceedings of the NCAA and contemporaneous 
media articles to make its case.  In so doing, the article challenges 
commonly held assumptions about the origins of present intercollegiate 
 
 *  Professor of Law, the George Washington University Law School, J.D. Harvard 
Law School.  This article is part of a series on the NCAA.  See also W. Burlette Carter, 
Student Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1 (2000); W. 
Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Nonprofit 
Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851 (2002).  I thank the NCAA 
for long ago allowing me access to its library; Germaine Leahy of the George Washington 
University Library staff for her assistance and the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law for their superb assistance in getting this article to 
press.  
 1. Very few other detailed histories of the NCAA exist.  The significant ones are 
both commemorative.  The NCAA commissioned journalist Jack Falla to write its official 
Seventy-fifth Anniversary history.  JACK FALLA, NCAA, THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS: A 
DIAMOND ANNIVERSARY HISTORY, 1906-1981 (1981).  It turned to the President of the 
University of Nevada, Reno, Joe Crowley, for its centennial version.  JOE CROWLEY, IN THE 
ARENA: THE NCAA'S FIRST CENTURY (2006).   For an abbreviated NCAA view see Kay 
Hawes, Its Object Shall Be Regulation and Supervision: NCAA Born from Need to Bridge 
Football and Higher Education, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/active/3623n27.html.  
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athletics policy, providing a much-needed history to frame judicial, 
legislative and educational approaches to intercollegiate sports 
regulation. 
 
I.        IN THE BEGINNING ...................................................................... 214 
A.  Football—and “False College Colors”: The Founding of 
the NCAA ............................................................................. 214 
B.  Drafting and Ratifying a Constitution and Bylaws: The 
Essentials of an Amateur Program ..................................... 220 
C.  Growing the Membership ..................................................... 225 
D.  A Moral Charge .................................................................... 229 
II.   KEY DEBATES.............................................................................. 230 
A. Amateurs and Amateur Programs ...................................... 230 
B. Preserving Academic Integrity Standards.......................... 235 
C. Controlling the Rising Cost of Athletics.............................. 236 
D. Securing the Status of Coaches as Full Time Teachers ..... 237 
E. Safety and the Future of Football ....................................... 238 
F. Scheduling, Post-Season Games and Travel ...................... 241 
III.   WAR GAMES AND NATIONAL SERVICE........................................ 244 
A. Responding to the Country’s Call........................................ 244 
B. The SATC’s .......................................................................... 250 
C. Recovering from War ........................................................... 254 
IV.    SEGREGATION AND ATHLETICS “FOR MEN” ................................ 257 
V.   THE “THREAT” OF THE PROFESSIONAL GAME ............................ 261 
VI.   THE “THREAT” OF THE MEDIA .................................................... 265 
VII.  OLYMPICS, PHYSICAL FITNESS, RULES, AND CHAMPIONSHIPS.. 267 
VIII.  CRACKS IN THE COALITION......................................................... 268 
IX.    REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST AND A CALL FOR A NEW 
AMATEURISM............................................................................... 273 
A.   A New Amateurism.............................................................. 276 
B.   Is Amateurism Outdated? ................................................... 284 
C. The Future of Intercollegiate Athletics: Amateurism or 
Professionalism? .................................................................. 287 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2006] THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 213 
 
 
 
The year 2006 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the 
founding of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).2  
At this milestone the NCAA occupies a unique place in American 
educational history and in American law.  Held up as a historical 
champion of amateurism in college sports, it has enjoyed the 
confidence of both legislators and the courts, and may well be the most 
powerful nongovernmental regulator in America.  Commanding a 
budget that approaches 500 million dollars,3 its power reaches not 
only the 1,000-plus educational institutions that are its members but 
also anyone who does business with them, not to mention hundreds of 
thousands of current and prospective participants in intercollegiate 
athletics.  One hundred years has brought a great many changes.  In 
important ways, the modern NCAA is quite different from the NCAA 
that its founders conceptualized. 
This article investigates the first quarter of a century of the 
NCAA’s history, using as its primary sources the NCAA’s annual 
convention proceedings for that period and contemporaneously-written 
media reports.  The goal is to identify the key debates that shaped the 
NCAA, to consider to what extent the assumptions, principles and 
ideals of the early NCAA are still reflected in the modern organization 
or have been abandoned in favor of new ones, to surmise what might 
have happened had the NCAA emerged from those debates to take 
different directions in shaping athletics policy than the paths it did 
indeed take, and to reflect upon how this information should affect the 
direction of intercollegiate athletics regulation in a modern era. 
The author concludes that despite courts’ widespread 
adherence to the notion that intercollegiate athletics continues an 
American tradition of amateurism, an accurate historical perspective 
requires us to accept that many modern-day intercollegiate athletic 
 
 2. As discussed in greater detail infra notes 19-20, in December 1905, at the 
behest of the Chancellor of New York University, a group of schools gathered in New York 
to shape a preliminary constitution for the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the 
United States which later became the NCAA.  Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United 
States, Palmer E. Pierce,  The International Athletic Association of the United States: Its 
Origin, Growth and Function, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION OF 
THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED STATES 27, 28 (1907) [hereinafter 
1907 PROC.]. Schools joined the body throughout 1906 by individually ratifying the 
constitution.  Id.  The NCAA’s first official convention was in December 1906.  Id. 
 3. See NCAA, The National Collegiate Athletic Association Revised Budget for 
Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2005 (Nov. 7, 2005), http://www1.ncaa.org/finance 
/2005-06_budget.pdf. 
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programs lack key components of traditional amateurism.  If courts 
are to continue to recognize amateurism as a value in cases 
challenging the NCAA and intercollegiate athletics policies; they must 
define what amateurism means in a modern era, identifying its 
essentials.  To begin this process of redefining amateurism, the author 
urges a disentanglement of the terms “amateurism,” “education,” and 
“intercollegiate athletics,” arguing that these terms have become 
muddled over the years.  Using a new amateurism yardstick, courts 
should place an amateurism thumb on the scale for intercollegiate 
athletics programs only if the program is infused with amateurism 
and only if challenged policies are also consistent with amateurism.  
The NCAA and member schools can help in this process of shaping a 
new amateurism; they cannot be its sole architects. 
Part I of this article discusses the NCAA’s founding.  Part II 
discusses the evolution of the NCAA within the first twenty-five years, 
by focusing on the key issues that confronted the founders.  Part III 
discusses the role World War I played in the growth of intercollegiate 
athletics.  Part IV discusses how the early NCAA dealt with the roles 
of minorities and women in sport.  Part V discusses the emergence of 
professional leagues, particularly in football, and the NCAA’s response 
to the professionals as a perceived threat.  Part VI discusses the 
NCAA’s historical relationship with the media.  Part VII discusses 
NCAA contributions to rules promulgation, championships and the 
formation of a national Olympic association.  Part VIII discusses 
cracks in the NCAA coalition that ultimately led to its membership 
splitting into three Divisions differentiated by size of program and 
amateurism philosophy.  Finally, Part IX asks what the NCAA’s 
founders would say if they could see that organization now and how 
lessons learned from this history should affect modern regulation of 
amateur athletics and of the NCAA. 
I.  IN THE BEGINNING 
A. Football—and “False College Colors”: The Founding of the NCAA 
In the fall of 1905, nineteen year old William Moore, a Union 
College student and a resident of New York State was fatally injured 
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in a game between Union and New York University (“NYU”).4  One 
newspaper reported the circumstances of his death in this way: 
 Moore was injured about the middle of the game, when the contest was closest 
and the play fiercest.  Although the accident temporarily delayed the game, as soon 
as the unfortunate half-back had been carried off the field, he was practically 
forgotten and the game proceeded to the end. 
 In an attempt to get through the New York center Moore went at the line head 
first like a catapult.  This play was his last. No one saw what Moore’s head struck 
but he dropped limply to one side of the scrimmage and the ball fell from his 
hands.  All efforts to revive him failed.  The spectators became so excited that they 
poured on the gridiron by the hundreds, until the police drove them back.  Moore 
died within six hours without regaining consciousness.5 
Moore was one of eighteen young men who died while playing 
football in the 1905 season.  More than 150 other young men were 
injured in service to the game that year.  Some branded it a brutal 
sport and called for its demise.6  By November 1905, Columbia 
University abandoned the game altogether.7 
Well before Columbia’s action and young Moore’s death, 
President Theodore Roosevelt was watching the football controversy 
from the White House.8  An avid sportsman, Roosevelt strongly felt 
the game had to be saved.9  In October of 1905, he called the athletic 
directors of the football programs at Harvard, Yale and Princeton to 
the White House to discuss what needed to be done.10  For Roosevelt, 
the answer seemed to lie in changing the rules of the game to 
discourage hazardous play.11  Indeed, the 1905 version of football was 
an amalgam of rugby and soccer, with plenty of extra roughness 
 
 4. Football Player Killed; William Moore, of Union College, Dies From Blow on 
Head, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1905.   
 5. Id.   
 6. See Deaths from Football Playing; Forty-Five Athletes Have Been Victims in the 
Past Five Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1905; see also Cartoon, Theodore Roosevelt 
Conference with Football Athletes, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1905; Reform in Football: Reform 
Must Come or the Game is Doomed, it is Declared, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1905; Few Injuries 
from Football, No Deaths Resulted from Southern Gridiron Season, CONST. (Atlanta), Dec. 
6, 1905, at 1 (claiming South had no deaths and conducted “clean athletics; comparing 
situation to that of eastern states and predicting new rules would come in 1906); Ten 
Football Deaths is the Record to Date, NEWARK DAILY ADVOC., Nov. 18, 1905 (noting record 
number of deaths, predicting more and discussing deaths in prior seasons). 
 7. Columbia Takes Drastic Action; Decides to Abandon Football, POST-STANDARD 
(Syracuse, N.Y.), Nov. 29, 1905, at 3. 
 8. See Ronald A. Smith, Harvard and Columbia and a Reconsideration of the 
Football Crisis of 1905-06, 8 J. OF SPORTS HIST. 5, 10-11 (Winter 1981). 
 9. Id. at 10. 
 10. Id. at 11. 
 11. See id. at 10-11. 
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thrown in.12  Players could link arms together or stay in close 
formations to obtain extra force or leverage against opponents.13  
Modern protections such as helmets and shoulder pads were unheard 
of.14 
Meeting the President at the White House that October were 
Walter Camp and John Owsley of Yale, J.B. Fine and A.R. 
Hillenbrand of Princeton, and Edward H. Nichols and William T. Reid 
Jr. of Harvard.15  After the meeting, Camp, the General Athletics 
Advisor at Yale, and a later football legend, issued a statement signed 
by the athletic leaders of the involved schools.  It read as follows: 
In a meeting with the President of the United States it was agreed that we 
consider an honorable obligation exists to carry out in letter and in spirit the rules 
of the game of football relating to roughness, holding and foul play and the active 
coaches of our universities being present with us pledged themselves to so regard it 
and to do their utmost to carry out that obligation.16 
Out of the Roosevelt meeting emerged what became known as 
the “American Football Rules Committee” (“FRC”).  In December of 
1905, Harvard, Yale and Princeton joined the U.S. Naval Academy, 
Cornell University, University of Chicago and the University of 
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia for the FRC’s first meeting.  That group 
began to promulgate football rules to be used nationally by those 
playing the game.  By January of 1906, Harvard declared that if 
football’s rules were not changed further, it too would abandon the 
game.17 
For his part, President Roosevelt continued to keep his eye on 
things as matters progressed.  Shortly after his October meeting, he 
attended the Harvard/Yale game, reportedly “to see whether his 
suggestions on the game have been put in place.”18 
 
 12. Hawes, supra note 1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. For a description of dangerous aspects of early football play, see Hawes, supra 
note 1. 
 15. See Smith, supra note 8, at 11 n.38. 
 16. Play by Rules, Request Made by Roosevelt; Walter Camp Issues Statement as to 
Conference at White House, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1905, at 1.  For more on the Roosevelt 
Meeting and football controversy see generally Smith, supra note 8. 
 17. Harvard Demands Reform; If Rules Are Not Changed, There Will Be No 
Football Games, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1906, at 3 (noting the position of Chairman of 
Harvard’s Athletic Committee that if Football Rules Committee does not make radical 
changes Harvard will go it alone and noting that Harvard suffered 145 injuries serious 
enough to cause players to miss a game). 
 18. Mr. Roosevelt Applies for Seats at the Harvard-Yale Game, WASH. POST, Nov. 
10, 1905. 
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Notably, the list of invitees to the White House and to the 
December Pennsylvania meeting was a limited one.  But William 
Moore’s death barely a month after the President’s call for reform, 
spurred NYU’s Chancellor, H.M. McCracken to action.  First, 
McCracken tried to convince NYU’s president to call for changes in 
football.  Unsuccessful, McCracken made his own call for educational 
institutions, including the Roosevelt group, to meet in New York City 
at a National Football Conference to discuss changes in the game. 19  
Sixty-eight institutions joined McCracken for that New York football 
conference in December of 1905.20  There, they agreed to form the 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (“IAAUS”).21 
In 1910, seeking a more distinctive description that indicated their 
nationwide aspirations, that group changed its name to the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association or “NCAA.”22 
One might wonder why two different groups of educational 
institutions, both concerned about the brutality of football, would meet 
separately in the same month, or indeed, why Roosevelt did not invite 
an even larger number of schools to meet with him.  One possibility is 
that Roosevelt, a Harvard alumnus, and the members of the Football 
Rules Committee were simply being elitist. There is no question that 
the schools Roosevelt targeted set both educational trends and the 
national tone of college football.  But a close look also reveals that the 
two groups’ founders had important differences in conceptions of how 
to cure the problem.  Roosevelt and the schools he contacted dearly 
wished to save the game.  NYU’s Chancellor McCracken, on the other 
 
 19. Three years later, in 1908, in addressing the very group he helped to found, 
Chancellor McCracken would reflect upon his actions in those days: 
Little credit can be given me for taking the responsibility for the call of the first 
convention.  The fatal accident upon the football field at University Heights 
coming when the agitation for the reform of football was at its height, constituted 
a loud call.  After I had in vain urged a university president, who was my senior, 
to act, it was made an imperative duty upon me to do what I could.  Hence the 
call in 1905. 
Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1909) 
[hereinafter 1908 PROC]. 
 20. Palmer E. Pierce, The International Athletic Association of the United States:  
Its Origin, Growth and Function, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 28 (reflecting on the 
history of the IAAUS). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using 
a Nonprofit Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REV. 851, 874 n.100 
(2002) [hereinafter Carter, In Loco Parentis].  For ease of reference, henceforth in the text, 
the IAAUS will be referred to as the NCAA. 
 
  
218 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW  [Vol. 8:2:211 
 
hand, along with the president of Union College, which William Moore 
had attended, felt strongly that the game should end.  Of football, 
McCracken apparently felt that “its attendant evils [are] practically 
impossible of correction.” 23  Indeed, it was apparently common 
knowledge among those who convened in New York in 1905 that the 
original intent of that meeting was to seek the abolishment of 
football.24 
There seemed to be one more difference between McCracken’s 
group and the smaller Football Rules Committee as the 1905 year 
ended.  By the end of their conference, the McCracken group had 
extended its agenda to “the reform not only of football but of 
intercollegiate athletics as a whole.”25  The agenda was dramatic 
because, in these days, most intercollegiate programs were controlled 
by undergraduate students.26 
In 1907, Captain Palmer Pierce of West Point spoke of a 
concern that students were parading in “false college colors,” i.e., not 
adhering to the tenets of amateurism as a key animus for the 
formation of a new body: 
 The year 1905 was memorable in the athletic world on account of a campaign 
waged against the various abuses that had grown up in college athletics.  
Newspapers were filled with articles reflecting, not only on the methods of play in 
various sports, but also on the amateur status of many members of prominent 
college teams.  Even the magazines took part in the discussion, and the need of 
change and reform in our supposedly amateur college athletics was emphasized by 
citing specific examples of proselyting, of prominent college players not really 
amateurs, and of the various covert forms of payment to certain men for their 
athletic services.  It was related in detail under what disguise money returns were 
given. For instance, one prominent player was said to have derived hundreds of 
dollars from the privilege of furnishing programs for games; another received the 
profit from a special brand of cigarettes named after him; a third was the 
ostensible head of an eating club, while still others were in the private employ of 
rich college graduates. 
 
 23. Opinions on Football; Only Two Prominent College Presidents Favor Abolition 
of the Game, DECATUR REV. (Ill.), Dec. 29, 1905, at 3. 
 24. Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States, 
in 1908 PROC. supra note 20, at 26 (noting division at 1905 meeting between those who 
wanted to abolish the game and those who wanted to reform it); see also Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 146 (1930) [hereinafter 1930 PROC.] (noting that Pierce was 
among those wanting to save the game in 1905).   
 25. 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 146 (commenting on the broadening of the 
agenda); see also infra Part I.B. (discussing the first NCAA constitution). 
 26. For further discussion of the decision to oust athletics from student control, see 
Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, 855-76. 
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 The use of athletic prowess for personal gain was said to be a widespread 
practice and it was hinted, if not directly stated, that the college authorities were 
cognizant of these violations of the principles of amateur sports. 
 Even the past history of many prominent athletes was brought before the 
public and their character as men of truth and as gentlemen was severely 
attacked.  In a word it was claimed that many professional athletes were parading 
under false college colors. 
 This sweeping condemnation of the prevalent ethics of college athletics 
inaugurated a strong movement to reform the manner of playing the leading 
intercollegiate sports.27 
Although McCracken was instrumental in founding the NCAA, 
he did not take a leadership part in its subsequent operations.28  The 
group elected West Point’s Palmer Pierce as its first President.  Pierce 
would lead the institution for the better part of its first twenty-five 
years, stepping aside briefly during World War I because of military 
commitments.29  At the 1905 meeting, the sixty-eight schools selected 
an Executive Committee and charged it to draft a constitution and 
bylaws for the new entity.30 
Because there was little or no support for abolishing football, a 
compromise position emerged.  First, the NCAA established its own 
Football Rules Committee to consider how to quell the game’s most 
dangerous aspects.31  Second, support was garnered for a resolution 
calling upon individual faculties to strictly limit intercollegiate 
athletics in favor of interclass and intramural games. 
 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Convention that, in the interest of the 
proper work of education, the number of intercollegiate match games in all 
branches of athletic sports, should be strictly limited by faculty vote. 
 
 27. Palmer E. Pierce, The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States, 
in 1908 PROC. supra note 20, at 27. 
 28. See 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 6 (noting that McCracken had not met with 
the group since its founding).   
 29. Pierce served as president from 1905 until 1913 and then returned to the 
Presidency in 1918 serving until 1929.  1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 26.   In 1930 he began 
service as the “Honorary President.” Id. The reason for the gap in service seems to have 
been his military deployment.  Id. As evidence by length of service, Pierce was a very 
popular president.  Id. Indeed, in 1907, he tried to tender his resignation after being called 
to active duty and restationed at Ft. Leavenworth, KS but the delegates declined to accept 
it.  Id.   
 30. The Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED 
STATES 10-12 (1906) [hereinafter 1906 PROC.].    
 31. Report of Secretary and Treasurer, in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 22.  
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 That interclass games and intra-mural athletics in general should be fostered, 
to the end that a larger number of students may receive the benefits, and that 
intercollegiate competitions be made rather an incident than the main end of 
college and university athletic sports.32 
For his own school, McCracken announced in 1906 that while 
NYU was “bound, in company with various other universities and 
colleges, to give the new game a trial,” its intercollegiate games would 
be “comparably few,” and that intramural games would dominate.33 
B.  Drafting and Ratifying a Constitution and Bylaws: The Essentials 
of an Amateur Program 
On March 31, 1906, the NCAA’s Executive Committee, led by 
Palmer Pierce, offered a constitution to the various schools for 
ratification. 34  Article VIII made it clear that the parties were taking a 
bold step beyond football, and even beyond intercollegiate athletics, 
attempting to take control of campus athletics across the board: 
The Colleges and Universities enrolled in this Association severally agree to take 
control of student athletic sports, as far as may be necessary to maintain in them a 
high standard of personal honor, eligibility, and fair play, and to remedy whatever 
abuses may exist.35 
However, by providing that institutions “severally” agreed, the 
constitution also made it clear that the member institutions did not 
cede power to the national body, but retained their autonomy. The 
parties wanted an open relationship in which members were free to 
date others; they did not want marriage.36  Thus, the constitution 
expressly provided that “the acceptance of a definite statement of 
eligibility rules” would not be a membership requirement and that, 
“the constituted authorities of each institution shall decide on methods 
of preventing the violation of the principles laid down in Article VI.”37 
 
 32. Id. at 25-26. 
 33. Trial of New Football; New York University Feels Bound to Make Experiment, 
WASH. POST, April 4, 1906, at 8. 
 34. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 12 (Pierce noting his leadership); Report of 
Secretary and Treasurer, in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 10. 
 35. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST. art. VIII, in 1906 
PROC., supra note 30, at 31. 
 36. Id. at 12 (noting that it was clear that a constitution that required institutions 
to cede power to a national body could not be widely ratified).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the evolution of the relationship among NCAA schools, see W. Burlette 
Carter, Student Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter Carter, Student Athlete]. 
 37. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, BYLAWS art. VII, in 1906 
PROC., supra note 30, at 34. 
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The constitution also spelled out the objective of the 
organization quite plainly: 
Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the 
United States, in order that the athletic activities in the colleges and universities 
of the United States may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the 
dignity and high purpose of education.38 
The first constitution divided the country into seven districts, each of 
which would render a report on athletic affairs in its region at the 
convention.  It embraced the principle of one delegate, one vote, 
provided for annual meetings, and named the organization’s principle 
officers, as well as an Executive Committee made up of the officers 
and one member from each district not represented by the President 
or Secretary.39  The Executive Committee was responsible for 
proposing amendments to the constitution and bylaws and conducting 
work of the Association in between conventions.40  The bylaws 
provided that each district would render a report at the annual 
meetings.41  As agreed, it also established a Football Rules Committee 
within the NCAA. 42 
 
 38. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST. art. II, in 1906 
PROC., supra note 30, at 29. 
 39. The districts were the New England States, the Middle States and Maryland, 
the Southern States, the Middle Western States, the Northwestern States, the 
Southwestern States, and the Pacific Coast States. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the 
United States, CONST. art. IV., § 1, in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 29-30.  It appears that 
in 1911 the Southwest District was divided in two to form the Sixth and Seventh Districts 
and a new Eighth District was added including the Pacific Coast, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, and Wyoming. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, CONST., in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 66 (1911) 
[hereinafter 1911 PROC.].  The 1912 Eighth District report noted that there were some 40 
Colleges in this district.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 8th District Report, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 22 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 PROC.].  Later, after the number of 
Pacific Coast increased schools, those schools became part of a new Ninth District.  See, 
e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, CONST., art. IV, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH 
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 114-15 (1916) 
[hereinafter 1916 PROC.].  By following the district reports one can have some view of 
developments in each region.  See also id. § 2 (listing the officers of the Association); id. art. 
VI (providing for an annual convention and giving each delegate one vote). 
 40. See, e.g., 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 21, 23 & 29. 
 41. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, BYLAWS art. VIII, in 1906 
PROC., supra note 30, at 36.  
 42. Id. art. V. The first members of that committee appear to have been Dr. Henry 
L. Williams (U. Minn.; chair); Prof. James T. Babbitt (Haverford), Lieutenant Charles D. 
Daly (West Point); Mr. E.K. Hall (Dartmouth); Prof. James T. Lees (U. Nebraska); C.W. 
Savage (Oberlin). See 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 22-23 (thanking them for their service 
to the NCAA). 
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The bylaws set forth guidelines “suggested as a minimum.”43  
They reflected a strong focus upon the principle of amateurism.  
Because of the difficulty of access to these documents and the 
importance of the original language used, I quote them extensively 
here.  First, Article VI defined the key “Principles of Amateur Sport.” 
 Principles of Amateur Sport 
 Each institution which is a member of this Association agrees to enact and 
enforce such measures as may be necessary to prevent violations of the principles 
of amateur sports such as 
 a.  Proselyting.[sic] 
 1.The offering of inducements to players to enter Colleges or Universities 
because of their athletic abilities and of supporting or maintaining players while 
students on account of their athletic abilities, either by athletic organizations, 
individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly. 
 2.The singling out of prominent athletic students of preparatory schools and 
endeavoring to influence them to enter a particular College or University. 
 b.  The playing of those ineligible as amateurs. 
 c.  The playing of those who are not bona-fide students in good and regular 
standing. 
 d.  Improper and unsportsmanlike conduct of any sort whatsoever, either on 
the part of the contestants, the coaches, their assistants, or the student body.44 
In Article VII, the constitution went further to define eligibility 
rules for student athletes. 
 1.  No student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate 
game or contest, who is not taking a full schedule of work as prescribed in the 
catalogue of the institution. 
 2.  No student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate 
game or contest who has at any time received either directly or indirectly, money 
or other consideration, to play on any team, or for his athletic services as a college 
trainer, athletic or gymnasium instructor, or who has competed for a money prize 
or portion of gate money in any contest, or who has competed for any prize against 
a professional. 
 In applying this rule the constituted authorities shall discriminate between the 
deliberate use of athletic skill as a means to livelihood, and technical, 
unintentional or youthful infractions of the rule. 
 
 43. See Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, BYLAWS art. VII, in 1906 
PROC., supra note 30, at 34. 
 44. Id. art. VI. 
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 3.  No student shall represent a College or University in an intercollegiate 
game or contest who is paid or receives, directly or indirectly, any money or 
financial concession or emolument as past or present compensation for, or as prior 
consideration or inducement to play in, or enter any athletic contest, whether the 
said remuneration be received from, or paid by, or at the instance of any 
organization, committee or faculty of such College or University, or any individual 
whatever. 
 This rule shall be so construed as to disqualify a student who receives from any 
source whatever, gain or emolument, or position or profit, direct or indirect, in 
order to render it possible for him to participate in college or university athletics. 
 In case of training table expenses, no organization or individual shall be 
permitted to pay for the board of a player at said table more than the excess over 
and above the regular board of such player. 
 4.  No student shall represent a College or University in any intercollegiate 
game  or contest who has participated in intercollegiate games or contests during 
four previous years. 
 5.  No student who has been registered as a member of any other College or 
University shall participate in any intercollegiate game or contest until he shall 
have been a student of the institution which he represents at least one college year. 
 6.  Any football player who has participated in an intercollegiate football 
contest in any College or University and leaves without having been in attendance 
two-thirds of the college year in which he played shall not be allowed to play as a 
member of the team during the next year’s attendance at the same institution. 
 7.  Candidates for positions on athletic teams shall be required to fill out cards, 
which shall be placed on file, giving a full statement of their previous athletic 
records as follows: 
 Eligibility Card 
 Name of College or University. 
 Date. 
 Name of player or contestant. 
 Age of player or contestant. 
 Weight of player or contestant. 
 Branch of sport or contest. 
 Questions. 
 1.  On what date this session did you register? 
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 2.  Have you ever at any time competed for a money prize, or against a 
professional for any kind of prize? 
 3.  Have you ever received money or any other compensation or concession for 
your athletic services, directly or indirectly, either as a player or in any other 
capacity? 
 4.  How many hours of recitations and lectures are you attending per week?  
How many hours of practical work? 
 5.  How long have you been a student at (Name of your institution)? 
 6.  Did you receive any inducement or concession to attend (Name of your 
institution)? 
 7.  Have you ever participated in intercollegiate contests as a member of a 
(Name of your institution) team?  If so, state what team or teams, and when. 
 8.  Have you ever taken part in any intercollegiate contest as a member of the 
team of any College or University other than (Name of your institution)?  If so, 
state what institution you represented, on what team or teams, and when 
 9.  Have you won an initial at any institution?  (In your answer give the date 
and place.) 
 10.  If on a team in any other institution, what position did you fill? 
 11.  Have you ever taken part, as a member of any athletic club team, in any 
baseball or football game or games, or any track event? 
 12.  Have you ever played baseball on a summer team?  If so, what team or 
teams, and when?  Have you ever received for such playing any compensation or 
emolument? 
 13.  Did you hold a scholarship of any kind?  If so, how and by whom awarded? 
 14.  Do you hold any official position in your College?  If so, at what salary, and 
for how long have you held it? 
 15.  Are you under a contract or understanding expressed or implied to engage 
in athletics at (Name of your institution) for money or any other consideration or 
emolument to be received from any source whatever, either directly or indirectly? 
 On my honor as a gentleman I state that the above answers contain the whole 
truth, without any mental reservation. 
(Date)(Signature).45 
 
 45. Id. art. V. 
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C.  Growing the Membership 
Although sixty-eight institutions responded to McCracken’s call 
to meet in 1905, by the end of 1906, only thirty-nine schools had 
ratified the NCAA constitution.46   
Of these, only twenty-eight actually attended the first 
convention in December, 1906. 47 
When one looks at this list of original members, one notes 
several things.  First, as discussed earlier, despite repeated 
invitations, conspicuously absent were the members of the FRC.  
Without these national academic and football powerhouses, the 
NCAA’s power was limited. 
Second, these original members were not representative of the 
entire country.  Vanderbilt and North Carolina were the only 
Southeastern Institutions, and there were only a few from the 
Southwest, (although the University of Texas at Austin and 
University of Virginia would join the next year).48  There were also no 
institutions from the Pacific Coast states. 
One possible explanation for the absence of some institutions is 
distance and travel costs.  But another clear reason for absences was 
that some schools already belonged to strong conferences that had the 
power to legislate for members.  For example, the Southern 
Intercollegiate Athletic Association was organized in 1893.49  Western 
schools could look to the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty 
 
 46. These original members were:  Allegheny College, Amherst College, Bucknell 
University, Colgate University, Dartmouth College, Denison University, Dickinson College, 
Franklin and Marshall, George Washington University, Grove City College, Haverford 
College, Lehigh University [Pa.], Miami University [Ohio], New York University, Niagara 
University, Oberlin College, Ohio Wesleyan University, Rutgers College, Seton Hall 
College, Swarthmore College, Syracuse University, Tufts College, Union College, 
University of Colorado [Boulder], University of Minnesota, University of Missouri, 
University of Nebraska, University of North Carolina [Chapel Hill], University of 
Penn[sylvania], University of Rochester, University of Wooster [Ohio], U.S. Military 
Academy [West Point], Vanderbilt University, Washington and Jefferson College, Wesleyan 
University (Conn.), Western University, Westminster College (Pa.), Williams College, and 
Wittenberg College. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 4, 11.  But see Palmer E. Pierce, The 
International Athletic Ass’n of the United States: Its Origin, Growth and Function, in 1907 
PROC., supra note 2, at 29 (asserting that 38 institutions had ratified the 1906 
constitution). 
 47. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 7-9 (listing the “accredited delegates”).  Missing 
were Amherst, Denison, George Washington, Grove City, Miami (Ohio), Tufts, Univ. of 
North Carolina, Univ. of Pennsylvania, Rochester, Westminister and Wittenburg.  Cf. id. 
 48. 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 2-4 (listing the roll of members). 
 49. See 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 18; W.L. Dudley, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1907 PROC., 
supra note 2, at 9. 
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Representatives and the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the 
Southwest which dated back to 1895 and 1903, respectively.  The Big 
Ten Conference dates back to 1895.50  Institutions belonging to 
conferences that had regulatory authority were hesitant to affiliate 
with a national group that might conflict with their conferences’ will.  
Conference membership was also a valuable commodity not to be 
jeopardized. 
One also notices that smaller colleges and universities 
dominate the initial group.  Smaller schools were less likely to have 
large athletic programs and, consequently, were also less likely to 
have a financial investment in the perpetuation of athletics, alumni 
who would vocally challenge a cutback, or the budget to increase 
athletics.  As a consequence, smaller institutions were also more likely 
to favor the reduction of intercollegiate athletics and specialized 
training in favor of universal participation and intramural models.51 
The delegates at McCracken’s first meeting were 
overwhelmingly faculty members with professorial status and no 
specific tie to an athletic department, with a few college presidents 
thrown in.52  Eleven schools sent representatives to the 1906 
convention as “visiting delegates,” including historically African-
American Howard University.53  The University of Chicago, an FRC 
member, also visited in the person of its Director of Athletics, Alonzo 
Stagg.54  Despite his visiting status, Stagg expressed his strong 
support for the formation of a national organization, and, after 
Chicago joined, he served on the NCAA’s executive committee for 
several years.55 
Recognizing that having two football rules committees was not 
workable, the NCAA asked the members of the FRC to form a single 
ruling group under the umbrella of the NCAA.56  The FRC’s members 
 
 50. See Big Ten Conference, Big Ten History,  http://bigten.collegesports.com/ 
trads/big10-trads.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).  It was originally known as the 
Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives.  Id. 
 51. Indeed, the Association of Colleges in New England passed a resolution to that 
very effect in 1907.  See F.W. Nicolson, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 9. 
 52. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 7-9. 
 53. Id. at 9-10.  Howard was represented by William J. Decatur.  Id. 
 54. Id. Chicago was represented by Alonzo Stagg.  Id. 
 55. Id. at 23. 
 56. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, CONST., art. V in 1906 
PROC., supra note 30, at 33; id. at 22 (resolving to make invitation); Rep. of Comm. On 
Membership, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 17-18 (expressing willingness to revise 
Constitution if members of the AFRC were to join). 
 
  
2006] THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 227 
 
initially declined.57  By the time of the 1906 NCAA convention, 
however, the parties had reached a temporary agreement, to be 
renewed annually.  Under it, NCAA football rules committee and the 
FRC acted together as a single committee outside the NCAA 
structure. That body was named the American Intercollegiate Rules 
Committee (“AIRC”) or “the amalgamated committee.” 58  The NCAA 
rules committee also created a subcommittee, a “Central Board of 
Officials,” to be a central clearinghouse for those who would officiate 
the college game.59  Through the joint football rules committee, 
football legend Walter Camp and others would shape the future of the 
game.60 
The NCAA leadership realized that it could not claim national 
relevance without national membership.  To further this goal, the 
NCAA published the addresses and the proceedings of its convention 
and sent them free of charge to schools across the country.61  The 
NCAA fashioned itself as a declarant of ideals only and expressed 
support for the formation of local conferences, which it hoped would 
behave consistently with NCAA goals. 
But within a year, this aspirational-only approach was testing 
the patience of those desiring changes in intercollegiate athletics.  In 
1907, the NCAA unanimously adopted an amendment to its 
Constitution, stating that its members were “bound by the provisions” 
of the NCAA’s Constitution and Bylaws and that legislation enacted in 
conferences was binding upon members unless the institution 
submitted a formal objection to the Executive Committee of the 
NCAA.62  The next year the Association declared that although 
individual institutions retained responsibility for details, the 
 
 57. Rep. of Comm. On Membership, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 19 (reporting 
that Harvard and Cornell declined invitation to join; U.S. Naval Academy, Yale and 
Princeton had not replied); see also Lack Power to Unite; Overtures rejected by Football 
Rules Committee, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1905, at 8 (stating that the original rules 
committee lacks power to merge with IAAUS committee and must consult its individual 
member schools). 
 58. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 13; Rep. of Comm. On Membership, in 1907 
PROC., supra note 2, at 19. 
 59. The Central board in turn appointed subsidiary regional boards.  1906 PROC., 
supra note 30, at 13-14.  The reports of this subcommittee offer an interesting glimpse of 
the history of intercollegiate officiating. 
 60. See, e.g., Rep. of the Chairman of the Rules Comm., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, 
at 20 (noting Camp’s contribution). 
 61. Address of President Palmer Pierce, in 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 49 (noting 
influence of organization). 
 62. Rep. of Comm. on Summer Baseball, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 24-25. 
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Association expected each member to make a bona fide effort to 
enforce the principles of amateur sports and encouraged members to 
form conferences through which this enforcement could be secured.63  
However, proposed language that would have authorized the 
Executive Committee to hear evidence of offenses was rejected.64 
The approach of disowning any claim to legislative authority 
while still insisting on adherence to its constitution and bylaws 
revealed a schizophrenia that would plague the NCAA throughout its 
lifetime.  The disease was born of the internal struggle between those 
members who wanted a weak central body and absolute institutional 
autonomy and those who wanted a strong NCAA with sanctioning 
authority.65 
Recognizing that more schools, and especially schools with 
major athletic programs, were indispensable to their efforts, the 
NCAA created a special Membership Committee to woo them.  In 
1907, the committee’s invitation letter assured recipients that “your 
institution will lose none of its independence if it should join us in the 
work.”66  In one of its most imaginative moves, in 1907 the NCAA 
allowed schools to join together and seek membership within the 
NCAA, either as a conference or as joint members.67  Each group of 
joint members had a right to a single delegate.68  This plan was 
ingenious, for it created a way for the powerful conferences to come 
under the NCAA umbrella, raising the potential that they could be 
subject to its control.  It also allowed schools that could not convince 
their entire conferences to come on board or could not justify the 
minimal dues to band together in a membership.69  But the plan was 
also potentially self-destructive.  It stood to reason that if those 
favoring amateurism within the NCAA could not control the 
conferences, then the conferences would ultimately undercut 
amateurism within the NCAA. 
Each year the NCAA’s membership grew.  At the 1911 
proceedings, President Palmer Pierce proudly reflected upon that 
growth, noting, “In 1906, thirty-nine individual universities and 
 
 63. Amendments to Constitution and to By-Laws, in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 
22. see also 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 28 (encouraging the formation of conferences). 
 64. Amendments to Constitution and to By-Laws, in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 
21-23.   
 65. For more on this struggle see Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 6-26. 
 66. Rep. of Comm. on Membership, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 16. 
 67. Rep. of Comm. on Summer Baseball, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 25. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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colleges were on its rolls; in 1907, forty-nine; in 1908, fifty-seven; in 
1909, sixty-seven; in 1910, seventy-six; and this year ninety-five.”70  
One by one the members of the FRC joined.  First was the University 
of Chicago in 1907;71 then Harvard in 1909;72 then Princeton and 
Cornell in 1914;73 Yale in 1915;74 and finally the Naval Academy in 
1921.75  By the end of its first twenty-five years, the institutional 
membership exceeded 150 schools.  Today, of course, the number is in 
excess of 1200 four-year institutions. 
D.  A Moral Charge 
The NCAA’s founders viewed themselves as fulfilling a moral 
charge and offering great national service by preparing young male 
citizens. 
 The effect upon the national character of permitting intercollegiate contests to 
be conducted under false pretenses . . . must be admitted to be seriously bad . . . . 
There can be no question but that a boy or young man, who is habituated to the 
endeavor to win games by means, some of which he knows to be unfair and against 
the rules, later will play the game of life with the same ethical standards.76 
NCAA President Pierce argued that the approach to athletics in 
England allowed a personal tutor to guide a small group of  students 
on both the intellectual and athletics issues and thus, by promoting 
amateurism, had a broad influence on national life in that country.77  
Pierce said, however, that the English system could not work in 
America, for the country was too large, its interests were too 
divergent, and the tutorial system was too infrequent in America.78  
He thus concluded that “[t]he same inference can become effective in 
 
 70. Pierce, 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 58. 
 71. 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 3. 
 72. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n of the United States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED 
STATES 7 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 PROC.]. 
 73. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 7 (1914) [hereinafter 1914 PROC.]. 
 74. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 8 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 PROC.]. 
 75. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 3 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 PROC.] 
(Although unlike in other cases, the conference proceedings do not report the admission of 
the Naval Academy; that institution first appears on the membership roll in that year). 
 76. Palmer E. Pierce, The Int’l Athletic Ass’n of the United States, in 1907 PROC., 
supra note 2, at 30. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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the United States only by the concerted efforts of educators, working 
through national organizations.”79 
McCracken also stated the charge in moral terms.  He stated, 
“When those activities of a young man which most fix his attention, 
excite his ambitions and stir his feelings are kept on a high moral 
plane, then a great deal is done towards making his a life of 
morality.”80 
As I have argued in a prior article, “Responding to the 
Perversion of In Loco Parentis,” an important key to understanding 
how NCAA institutions viewed their right, and indeed obligation, to 
take over college athletics is the doctrine of in loco parentis.81   Vis-à-
vis their students, schools acted in the place of a parent, and could 
indeed control student behavior both on and off campus, if they felt 
that such control was for the good of the student.82  Courts 
consistently rejected legal challenges to this authority, deferring to the 
sound judgment of educators.83 Because they acted under the in loco 
parentis doctrine, these educators never questioned the extent of the 
authority they should have over student-athlete lives.  Their power 
was a given.  
II. KEY DEBATES 
A. Amateurs and Amateur Programs 
As I have described elsewhere, the model to which framers of 
the NCAA thought their students should aspire was that of the 
gentleman amateur.  An amateur was one who played sports as an 
avocation, who derived his pleasure from the game itself and not 
external factors such as fame or fortune.84 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 7. 
 81. See Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 852-53, 855-59, 862-63, 878-79; 
see also Clarence A. Waldo, The Proper Control of College Athletic Sports, in 1908 PROC., 
supra note 20, at 40, 43 (“Long and undisputed custom has left things to the faculty and 
properly so, for say what we will, the college faculty is in loco parentis.”). 
 82. Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 852-53, 855-59, 862-63, 878-79. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 862. 
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Amateurism purists were fond of citing something they called 
the “amateur spirit,”85 which was a general way of approaching 
athletics embodying morality and fair play.  Conceptions of fair play 
were a product of the times.  Thus, actions like taking a time out 
merely to upset the rhythm of an opposing team,86 blocking runners 
from a base or attempting to pry runners off base,87 catchers talking 
trash to batsmen and general talking on the field88 were considered 
unsportsmanlike conduct indicative of a professional spirit not an 
amateur one. 
This spirit also prescribed fan behavior at amateur events.  It 
was considered inappropriate for a crowd to cheer or chatter in order 
to rattle an opposing team during play.89  Indeed, one First District 
report cited with giddy approval the behavior of losing fans at a New 
England college who cheered winning fans as the latter group did a 
triumphant snake dance on the field!90  An on-field snake dance by 
winners would likely be received very differently by losing football 
fans at most of today’s games. 
Pure amateurists railed against paid or professional coaches 
hired for merely a season or two.  They argued that coaches should 
come from the regular faculty; and at the very least, coaches should 
have a permanent connection with the institution as educators or 
volunteer alumni.  As athletics began to spiral out of control, some 
even argued that schools should return to using undergraduates as 
coaches.91  Amateurism also defined how a coach coached.  Proponents 
argued that unless they were undergraduates like the players, coaches 
should not coach from the sidelines during a game.  Properly 
 
 85. See, e.g., Luther H. Gulick, Amateurism, in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 40-43; 
1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 11, 64.  The amateur purists are also discussed in Carter, In 
Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 866-70. 
 86. 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 31. 
 87. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Comm. on Ridding College Baseball of its 
Objectionable Features, PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 41 (1913) [hereinafter 1913 PROC.]. 
 88. Comm. on Ridding College Baseball of its Objectionable Features, in 1913 
PROC., supra note 87, at 42 (discussing catcher chatter); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASS’N 10 (1912) [hereinafter 1912 PROC.] (discussing “yapping” by players). 
 89. See 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 47.   
 90. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 18 (1927) [hereinafter 1927 
PROC.]. The Yale snake dance apparently dated back to the early 1900’s.  See Yale, 6; 
Harvard, 0; Sons of Old Eli Conquerors of Eastern Gridiron, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1905. 
 91. For more on coaching see Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 861, 868-
69, 884. 
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conducted, a coach’s work was done before the game.  Thus, during a 
game, coaches should either sit quietly on the bench or not appear on 
the bench at all if they were not themselves students.92  In the view of 
amateurists, this approach preserved the game as primarily a game 
for undergraduates and avoided the image of professionalism. 
Of course, the grand centerpiece on the altar of amateurism 
was the principle that the amateur did not receive pay for play, 
directly or indirectly.  Amateurists opposed training tables and 
scholarships based in any part on athletic ability.93  Most of the upper 
classes and many in the middle considered it despicable to make 
money playing sports or to play with those who did.94  The gospel of 
amateurism was to guide all aspects of a sportsman’s life.  Thus, in 
1927, when golfer Bobby Jones, then married with a family, decided to 
accept a job writing about golf while still playing as an amateur, he 
set off a firestorm of controversy.95  Mary K. Browne did the same 
when she sought to be a professional in tennis, while an amateur in 
golf.96 
Of course, amateurists opposed the training table and athletic 
scholarships.  On the latter point, the author of the Carnegie 
Foundation’s famous 1929 report on athletics programs at schools, 
asserted, “Athletic scholarships have no place in the American college 
. . . .”97  And in 1930, the famous Carnegie Committee study on 
campus-based athletics concluded that athletic scholarships were 
“entirely inexcusable.”98  Somehow, it was believed, or at least 
professed, that the mere acceptance of money in any form made it 
impossible for a professional to enjoy the game for its own sake or to 
aspire to lofty principles such as sportsmanship.  Similarly, if 
 
 92. See, e.g., 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 11, 31, 55; 1912 PROC., supra note 39, at 
10. 
 93. Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 862. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Grantland Rice, The Sportlight, BRIDGEPORT TELEGRAM, Apr. 27, 1927.  The 
author argued that Jones should be afforded a chance to make a decent living to support 
his wife and children, given that other career options had not panned out for him 
financially and since others were making money off of his name.  Id.  Moreover, he argued 
that top rated amateurs were required to devote so much time to their sport it was 
unreasonable to completely bar them from trying to make a living in another sport or 
indirectly profiting from their amateur status.  Id. 
 96. Id.   
 97. Howard J. Savage, The Elimination of Recruiting and Subsidizing, in 1930 
PROC., supra note 24, at 127. 
 98. Spec. Comm. Rep., Rep. of Comm. to Study Carnegie Found. Bulletin 23, in 1930 
PROC., supra note 24, at 83.  
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amateurs played with professionals, even if the amateurs did not 
accept money, they might gain unfair advantage, and even worse, 
bring the disease of professionalism back to infect amateur teams. 
Theoretically, amateurism also defined a school’s approach to 
its sports programs.  Some who touted amateurism, objected to schools 
using their programs for advertising purposes and doubted the value 
of this argument as a reason for athletics.99  They objected to schools 
collecting gate receipts, believing that these inevitably undermine the 
educational purpose of athletics, by making the program commercially 
dependent upon outsiders, and thus beholden to their views.  Instead, 
they argued athletics should be financed through the institution.100  
These amateurists viewed the primary purpose of an institution’s 
program to be athletics for all or universal participation.  Thus, they 
argued that intercollegiate athletics should be minimized and 
intramurals should be the dominant approach.  They argued against 
intersectional games, which required students to travel long distances 
and pitted unnatural rivals against each other. In their view, such 
games overextended athletes and undercut the educational purpose of 
sports.  Purists were very much against specialized recruiting that 
targeted athletes. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the amateurism debate also had a 
class context.  Amateurists borrowed the concept of the gentleman-
amateur from England.  Pay for play was considered low-class and 
beneath a gentleman, so amateurism’s values reflected some high-
brow biases against the lower classes who regularly engaged in such 
activities to make extra money.101  Opposition to developing 
intercollegiate athletics also reflected opposition to educational 
specialization in any form, a key tenet of supporters of the liberal 
arts’s approach to education.  Thus, the debate between proponents of 
a liberal arts approach and those who favored professional training 
directly impacted debates over specialized training and recruiting in 
intercollegiate athletics.102  At the same time, some amateurists 
genuinely felt strongly that students and education would be harmed 
 
 99. See, e.g., 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 3 (colleges should not use sport for 
advertising); James R. Angell, The Familiar Problems of College Athletics, in 1930 PROC., 
supra note 24, at 109 (same view and also doubting advertising justification for athletics); 
C.W. Hetherington, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 16. 
 100. Dudley A. Sargent, Competition in College Athletics, in 1909 PROC., supra note 
72, at 53. 
 101. Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 862-64. 
 102. Id. at 869-70. 
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if intercollegiate athletics programs were exploited by institutions, 
and that it was their duty to protect both. 
As with all religions, amateurism’s converts displayed ranges 
of zeal.  Each school felt free to let the spirit guide it as it saw fit.  In 
1927, one delegate dared state that he did not understand why schools 
should not train athletes to enter the professional ranks, just as they 
train students to enter law or business, or why willing alumnae should 
not be allowed to provide students with financial support.103  In 1925, 
another argued that it was impractical to insist on absolute 
amateurism, given the refusal of institutions to finance athletics as 
part of their general budgets.104  Some converts saw no inconsistency 
in attacking others who professed professionalism, but supporting 
professional tendencies in amateur programs.  In 1925 the Chairman 
of the Big Ten Conference attacked advocates of professional football, 
but praised the college intersectional “bowl” games that lined 
educational and private coffers and often took students thousands of 
miles away from classes.105  Indeed, even as President Roosevelt 
denounced the college athlete who accepted money for play, he 
supported the moves of his 1905 group to expand intercollegiate 
football and increase their gate receipts.106 
Interestingly, it was baseball, not football, that presented the 
greatest challenge to student adherence to amateurism principles in 
the NCAA’s earliest days.  This is true because by the time of the 
NCAA’s founding, professional baseball teams and leagues were 
already well established outside of colleges and universities, and 
student participation in them during summer months and academic 
years was widespread.  Despite the high and lofty principles in the 
NCAA’s constitution and bylaws, district report after district report 
 
 103. D.A. Penick, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 32. 
 104. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 61-78 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 
PROC.] (explaining the debate about whether amateur law should be enforced in all 
intercollegiate competitions).   
 105. See Big Ten Athletic Commissioner Sees Harm in Professional Athletics, IOWA 
CITY PRESS CITIZEN, July 10, 1925, at 6 (discussing the speech of Big Ten Conference 
Commissioner John Griffith); Big Ten Chief Explains Why of Intersectional Football, IOWA 
CITY PRESS CITIZEN, July 10, 1925, at 6.  
 106. Speaking to his Harvard Class, alumnus Roosevelt declared that the “college 
undergraduate who in furtive fashion becomes a semi-professional is an unmitigated curse” 
and argued that such students cannot help to put their country on a proper plane “if in his 
own college career his code of conduct has been warped and twisted.  See Honesty in Sport, 
Roosevelt’s Plea: Semi-Professional Athlete Pronounced an Unmitigated Curse, POST-
STANDARD, June 29, 1905 (discussing President Roosevelt’s comments on the topic). 
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soon made it clear that schools did not have the courage to declare 
ineligible some of their best athletes on the basis of summer baseball 
play. 107  Moreover, it was difficult to track student involvement in 
summer games, particularly if the student was not inclined to report it 
on the eligibility card. Thus, lacking NCAA legislative authority, 
amateurism purists had to watch in frustration. 
B.  Preserving Academic Integrity Standards 
A common problem for educational institutions was preserving 
academic integrity in the intercollegiate athletic environment.  
Alumni and the public pressured universities to admit students who 
did not meet and could not meet the college’s admissions criteria, and 
to waive academic standards for admitted students who were also 
athletes.  The term “sporty professor” came to be used for the professor 
willing to alter athlete grades.108 
Here too, however, the prevailing culture of education made it 
difficult to protect intercollegiate athletics from outside influence.  
Many schools refused to recognize athletics training as part of their 
educational curriculum.  Therefore, class schedules provided no time 
in a crowded school day for athletes to train or practice, leaving such 
work to after-hours periods.109  The lack of recognition in the 
curriculum also meant no money provided to athletics in the general 
institutional budget.  Thus, to finance athletics, teams had to win.  As 
a result of these tensions, student athletes became overextended, both 
academically and physically.  The problem was exacerbated when 
practices and games stretched into vacation periods and the pre- and 
post-seasons.110 
Early on, the conferences and individual schools took steps 
toward establishing minimum requirements for athletes.  These 
included establishing admissions standards, establishing minimum 
course hours for matriculation, limiting years of college competition 
 
 107. E.g., H.A. Peck, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 11 (support for 
summer baseball exception); 1912 PROC., supra note 39, at 33 (reference to summer 
baseball promoters); S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 23 
(summer baseball still a problem); see also Scott A. McQuilkin, Summer Baseball and the 
NCAA: The Second “Vexation”, 25 J. OF SPORTS HIST., at 18, n.74 (1998). 
 108. 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 14, 15. 
 109. Dudley A. Sargent, Competition in College Athletics, in 1909 PROC., supra note 
72, at 54 (noting college and student prejudices against athletics); 1911 PROC., supra note 
39, at 43 (noting views of some that athletics incompatible with intellectual life). 
 110. See discussion infra Part II.F. 
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and banning freshmen from intercollegiate teams.111  The NCAA put 
its support behind these efforts, but there was no uniform approach, to 
curb transfers and school hopping. It also encouraged the wider 
adoption of a “freshman rule,” requiring one year of residency at an 
institution before one could play varsity athletics.112 
C.  Controlling the Rising Cost of Athletics 
As institutions became more and more involved in athletics 
management, they found themselves struggling to curtail the rising 
costs of their programs.  Two items were at the center of expenditures 
concerns: new stadiums and top coaches. 
 As fan demand increased, institutions built stadiums to meet 
that demand which resulted in competing institutions feeling a need 
to do the same to keep up.  Thus, the Ninth District reported in 1921 
that two stadiums had been added among its schools and over one 
million dollars had already been raised for a third.113  Ohio State 
University completed a 64,000 seat stadium in 1921.  That same year, 
the University of Illinois had plans to build a 75,000 seat stadium.  
Other Big Ten Schools were not far behind. Michigan, Chicago and 
Wisconsin had new stadiums or new stadium plans in 1921.114  Brown 
University erected a $750,000 gym in 1928.115  Nebraska broke ground 
on a 30,000-person stadium in 1923.116 Vanderbilt celebrated its new 
stadium the same year.117 Indeed, one convention speaker called the 
twenties the “age of stadium building in America.”118  It would also be 
 
 111. 6th Dist. Rep., in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 21 (noting that district allows 
three years of competition which must be completed in four and required 10-12 hours of 
coursework); 6th Dist. Rep., in 1906 PROC., supra note 30, at 14 (noting practically every 
6th district school follows freshman rule).   
 112. R.B. Ogilby, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 31 (noting student 
and alumni resistance to freshman rule). 
 113. Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 49. 
 114. G.A. Goodenough, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 42; 
Comments of Pres. C.A. Richmond, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 82; see also Big Ten 
Schools Close Successful Financial Season; Five New Stadiums to be Built to Handle Large 
Crowds, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 25, 1921, at 14 (noting building at Ohio, Michigan). 
 115. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, OLIVER F. CUTTS, 1st Dist. Rep., in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASS’N 18 (1928) [hereinafter 1928 PROC.]. 
 116. LINCOLN SUNDAY STAR, Oct. 14, 1923 (groundbreaking for Nebraska stadium 
that seats 30,000). 
 117. Vanderbilt to Have New Stadium, BEE, (Danville, VA), Aug. 22, 1923. 
 118. S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 22.    
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the age of debt accumulation for some schools, as they struggled to pay 
the bonds that financed their new ventures.119 
Proponents of this growth made several arguments in support.  
First, they claimed that increased athletic presence provided an 
advertising benefit that would lead to more buildings in traditional 
programs such as chemistry and art.120  Second, they argued that if 
colleges did not build stadiums, private enterprise would, and football 
would fall into the latter’s hands.121  Professionalism supported by 
private investors was an unspeakable evil. 
In addition, many viewed top coaches as essential to winning 
and such coaches were expensive.  At the 1909 Proceedings, one 
speaker complained that some coaches commanded salaries higher 
than the college president at the same institutions.122  In 1921, 
another complained of part time coaches receiving $10,000 for ten 
weeks of work.123  These salaries were driven by the fact that winning 
coaches came at a premium, particularly in an environment where 
there was little or no job security for coaches. 
D. Securing the Status of Coaches as Full Time Teachers 
When colleges took the management of athletics away from 
students, various organizational plans emerged.  Famously, before the 
NCAA’s founding, the University of Chicago’s President, William 
Rainey Harper, created the position of Athletic Director (“director of 
the Department of Physical Culture”) for Alonzo Stagg in 1892.  In 
1926, Harvard created the position of “Director of Athletics” and made 
its holder a member of the faculty of Arts and Sciences.124  In 1906, 
Yale reportedly made the director of its gymnasium a full professor, 
after learning he was being courted by other schools.125  Walter Camp, 
 
 119. See S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 28 (discussing 
the building of stadium). 
 120. S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 22. 
 121. Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 49. 
 122. James Roscoe Day, The Function of Intercollegiate Athletics, in 1909 PROC., 
supra note 72, at 37. 
 123. R.B. Ogilby, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 29. 
 124. Oliver F. Cutts, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 19; see also 
Harvard Athletics, A Timeline of Tradition, http://gocrimson.collegesports.com/ 
genrel/101602aab.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 125. See College Athletics, WASH. POST, June 4, 1905, at 2; see also C.W. 
Hetherington, 6th Dist. Rep., in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 14 (noting that Midwestern 
Colleges were using department of physical education with faculty director); Hollon A. 
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the Director of Athletics at Yale, had a higher status than professor.  
He was football royalty. 
Unless he was a professor or an administrator, a football 
coach’s job security was tied to winning.126  Some schools hired a coach 
for the season only, releasing him after it was over. Some campuses 
used alumni coaches who gave their time at a reduced rate.  Others 
had contract coaches for a year or term of years.127  But early on, very 
few football coaches had professorial status, much less tenure or long 
contracts. 
At its 1910 convention, the NCAA adopted a resolution that 
coaching and training should be “confined to the regular members of 
the teaching staff, employed by the governing board of the institution, 
for the full academic year,” and that athletics should “be made a 
regular department, and receive the same consideration and be given 
equal responsibility and be held to the same accountability as any 
other department in the college or university.”128 Needless to say, this 
idea did not immediately take hold.  As resistance to integrating 
athletics into the curriculum continued, so too did the precarious 
situation of coaches. 
E. Safety and the Future of Football 
The first football reforms came out of the Roosevelt group.  
They adopted rules recommended by the University of Pennsylvania 
at their December, 1905 meeting.  The rules barred kneeing and 
slugging of players, imposed stiff penalties for rough play, added an 
umpire, and shortened the halves from thirty-five to thirty minutes.129  
In two major changes, the committee introduced the forward pass and 
 
Farr, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1916 PROC., supra note 39, at 10 (noting that New England colleges 
were still using student coaching in baseball). 
 126. See 5th Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 28 (noting coaching 
dismissals “without rhyme or reason”). 
 127. Thomas F. Moran, Courtesy and Sportsmanship in Intercollegiate Athletics, in 
1909 PROC., supra note 72,  at 64-65 (discussing various coaching approaches used across 
country). 
 128. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE UNITED STATES 35 (1910) 
[hereinafter 1910 PROC.]. 
 129. Declares for Reform, Football Rules Committee’s New Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 
10, 1905; Trial of New Football, For Football at Harvard, Chicago Favors Rules, Yale 
Athletic Reforms, WASH. POST  Apr. 4, 1906; see also John B. Foster, Football As It is to be 
Played This Year, DECATUR REV., Sept. 16, 1906 (reviewing rules of Football Rules 
Committee).   
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extended yards to down from five to ten.130  By extending yardage to 
down, the Committee hoped to reduce mass plays that gain little 
yardage but had the potential to impose great pain upon opposing 
teams.  With the same goal in mind, the Committee required that the 
team in possession must have six men on the scrimmage line at all 
times.131  Other changes included limiting timeouts to three per half, 
the adoption of a neutral zone at the scrimmage line, new off-sides 
rules, clearer fair catch signals, requiring the referee to whistle when 
a player is “down,” and describing what being “down” meant.132 
After its 1906 and 1907 meetings with the FRE, the NCAA 
football rules committee reported that a key objective of the new rules 
was to end mass play or piling up practices.133  The NCAA Report 
notes that because the scrimmage line and yards to down rules 
seriously restricted the offense, the new rules introduced the forward 
pass and the onside kick as offensive options to even things out.134  
According to the committee, larger schools complained bitterly that 
these new rules tended to favor light, fast and versatile teams of the 
smaller colleges versus the heavier and physically more powerful 
teams that tended to populate the larger colleges.135 
While these changes helped, a rash of football deaths in 1909 
renewed criticisms that football was too brutal.  In that year, 
according to an NCAA Committee, newspapers reported thirty-two 
deaths and numerous injuries in football.  Among the casualties were 
a West Point Cadet who died and an Annapolis midshipman whose 
injuries were then believed to be fatal.  The Committee claimed that 
only four men on the list of dead could really be properly called college 
players.136  It argued also that while the game had its risks, proper 
attention to rulemaking and restricting play only to healthy mature 
players could make it a game that institutions could be proud of.  
Another delegate stated that he and others had investigated the 
deaths and found that of the thirty-two deaths, eighteen “were not due 
 
 130. See Declares for Reform, supra note 129; Trial of New Football, supra note 129; 
Foster, supra note 129.     
 131. See Declares for Reform, supra note 129; Trial of New Football, supra note 129; 
Foster, supra note 129.   
 132.  See Declares for Reform, supra note 129; Trial of New Football, supra note 129; 
Foster, supra note 129.   
 133. Rep. of the Chairman of the Rules Comm., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 20. 
 134. Id. at 21.   
 135. Id. at 21-22; see also Rep. of Football Rules Comm., in 1909 PROC., supra note 
72, at 18-19.   
 136. Rep. of Football Rules Comm., in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 19-20. 
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to football”; three involved schoolboys from eleven to fifteen years of 
age; one was a member of an athletic club; and five were college 
students.137  He could not obtain information on the others.138 
Whatever the makeup of those dead players, sentiment against 
football was again aroused.  Some even considered asking states to 
make the playing of football a crime.139 Once again, however, the 
saviors of football carried the day. 
The joint Football Rules Committee went back to the drawing 
board. This time it required that seven rather than six offensive 
players remain on the line of scrimmage and prohibited offensive 
players from pulling or pushing the man with the ball, presumably to 
help him advance.  In addition, the rules prevented players from 
interlocking with each other on the line of scrimmage.  They 
established forward pass interference rules and limited the forward 
pass to twenty yards beyond scrimmage. They determined that a 
kicked ball had to travel at least twenty yards to be valid (affecting 
primarily the onside kick).  Diving tackles and “crawling with the ball” 
(referred to as “a well-recognized form of danger”) were prohibited.  
The Committee determined that when a ball was kicked neither side 
could interfere with an opponent within twenty yards of the line of 
scrimmage.  Stating that many injuries occurred when players were 
overtired or exhausted, the Committee also reduced the playing time 
for each half, introduced a three minute rest in the middle of each 
half, and allowed for players to be taken out of a game at any point 
and restored to the game at the start of any subsequent quarter.140 
By the 1911 Convention, the NCAA began to require an 
investigation whenever there were football fatalities among college 
men.  Insisting that one of the five deaths in that year involved a 
young man with a preexisting condition, the report for that year 
stressed the need for close medical supervision of students who wish 
to play the game.141  At this time, of course, there were virtually no 
guidelines for institutional medical care for student athletes, nor 
 
 137. Football Reform, in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, at 27. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 25. 
 140. 1910 PROC., supra note 128, at 27-28. 
 141. Rep. on Football Fatalities Among College Men, Season of 1911, in 1911 PROC., 
supra note 39, at 26-28 (reporting five college men deceased although questioning college 
status of one). 
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insurance programs to cover student-athletes142 for catastrophic 
injuries resulting from a game. 
F. Scheduling, Post-Season Games and Travel 
Despite some founders’ hopes that institutional intervention 
would lead to a de-emphasis of intercollegiate athletics, quite the 
opposite occurred once institutions took control of collegiate athletics 
away from students.  The number of seasonal games played by college 
athletes increased dramatically, and each major sport’s seasons 
extended well beyond the academic year.  By 1907 it was not 
uncommon for a college team to play three baseball games a week in a 
ten week season.143 
“Intersectional Contests”—games between schools in different 
conferences (and thus, different geographical areas)—posed yet 
another problem.  These intersectional contests were precursors to the 
modern “bowl” games.  Many of these contests predated the NCAA 
and emerged as local governments and businesses recognized football 
as a way to increase their exposure.  The first nationally known 
intersectional contest was the Rose Bowl.  It emerged out of the 
Tournament of Roses, an annual New Year’s Day event initiated in 
1890 by the Pasadena Hunt Club to showcase the California city’s 
year-round mild weather.144  The festivities initially consisted of a 
parade, accompanied by a day of various athletic events.145  Soon, 
however, the association and authorities got the grand idea of a “bowl 
game.”146  In 1902 Stanford played Michigan in the first “Rose 
Bowl.”147  But the “home” team lost so badly (Michigan walloped 
Stanford 49-0) that city leaders opted for a chariot race the next 
year.148  Still, football games returned for good to the festivities in 
 
 142. The term student-athlete is actually a recent term developed in the 1950s.  In 
the time period covered here, the NCAA most commonly referred to student-athletes as 
“boys” or students. 
 143. Paul C. Phillips, The Length of Intercollegiate Athletic Schedules, in 1907 
PROC., supra note 2, at 52 (noting the trend and questioning how students can do justice to 
college work and play three games a week). 
 144. Tournament of Roses, Tournament of Roses History, 
http://www.tournamentofroses.com/history (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). 
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1916, with the event using military teams in respect for wartime.149  
Intersectional contests occurred in other sports as well, but football 
presented the most elaborate examples.150 
The political and financial backing of local governments and 
businesses made intersectional contests difficult for many institutions 
to resist.  Although many bowl games were originally scheduled as 
regular-season games, when the NCAA and others made attempts to 
limit the number of games in a regular season these intersectional 
contests were simply moved to post-season or pre-season play, thus 
taking up more time in the student athlete’s schedule.151 
The Pacific Coast schools were particularly defensive of 
intersectional contest criticisms.  Noting that they had to travel great 
distances, even for regular season games, their NCAA district leader 
observed in 1921 that he failed to understand why travel for 
intersectional games was such an issue: 
Here in the West, the term “‘intersectional contests”‘ is applied almost exclusively 
to contests between teams from the far West and the East or middle West.  We 
have become accustomed on the Coast to games between institutions in the 
northwest and those in the southwest.  A team will travel from Los Angeles to 
Seattle, a distance of 1400 miles, or from Missoula, Montana to Los Angeles, a 
distance of 1700 miles, without exciting any comment.  If a game is scheduled 
between a western institution and one in the East or Middle West, however, the 
distance to be traveled immediately draws attention and some criticism.152 
 
 149. See id.; Tournament of Roses, Past Game Scores, 
http://www.tournamentofroses.com/history/gamescores.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2006); see 
also Los Angeles Sports & Entertainment Commission, History of L.A. Sports Events, 
http://www.lasec.net/sptshistory.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006); Carter, In Loco Parentis, 
supra note 22, at 887-88 (discussing bowl proliferation into the 1940s); infra Part III for a 
discussion of the impact of World War I on intercollegiate athletics. 
 150. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 3d Dist. Rep., in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N OF THE 
UNITED STATES 31-32 (1929) [hereinafter 1929 PROC.] (noting that the invitation to the 
University of Alabama to play in the Rose Bowl was “recognition of the fact that football is 
played in one section of the country as another”) see also Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 
1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 50 (mentioning with approval “intersectional games” 
between the University of Washington and Dartmouth and the University of Washington 
and Penn. State); W.B. Owens, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 46 (noting 
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and swimming meets). 
 151. G.A. Goodenough, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 41 
(conference expressed disapproval of post season games); I.S. Ashburn, 7th Dist. Rep., in 
1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 45 (noting 7th district season extends into the first week in 
December); H.V. Carpenter, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1927 PROC., supra note 90, at 34 (noting 
larger Pacific Coast Institutions playing Eastern schools in post-season); 1929 PROC., supra 
note 150, at 46 (noting marked increase in East versus West games). 
 152. W.B. Owens, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 46. 
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Moreover, the same leader noted that the area’s conference found that 
attempts to regulate schedules were “impracticable.”153 
Another development that troubled some amateurists about 
intersectional contests was the scheduling of games between schools of 
different sizes.  Smaller schools desired such match-ups because of 
their moneymaking potential in local areas.  Larger schools desired 
them because, by playing institutions that were not their rivals, they 
gained practice experience without possibly giving away any secrets.  
These games also often took students far away from their college or 
university. 
The growth of post-season intersectional contests meant not 
only an increase in the number of games students played, but also an 
increase in the distances students traveled—by railroad—to play 
these games, and an increase in missed classes.  Some schools tried to 
stem the tide.  In 1908, Williams College adopted a limitation that 
students could not travel more than 200 miles on athletic trips.154  But 
supporters of these contests heralded the airplane, stating that it was 
“only a matter of time” before that mode of travel would make game 
attendance much easier.155 
Of course as pre- and post-season games emerged, so did the 
perceived need for starting practices earlier or extending them into 
student vacations and recesses.156  Spring football practice became 
more and more common, and, though controversial, opponents did not 
or could not stop it.157 
 
 153. Leslie J. Ayer, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 48. 
 154. F.W. Nicolson, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1908 PROC., supra note 20, at 11. 
 155. See 6th Dist. Rep., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting that railroad 
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advantage of such travel. 
 156. 1911 PROC., supra note 39, at 9 (noting survey that mentions need to limit 
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III. WAR GAMES AND NATIONAL SERVICE 
A.  Responding to the Country’s Call 
The United States’s entry into World War I had a dramatic 
effect upon intercollegiate athletics in the United States.  Prior to U.S. 
involvement, references to the War at NCAA conventions were rare,158 
but President Woodrow Wilson’s Declaration of War on Germany in 
April of 1917 changed all that.  It also changed intercollegiate 
athletics, as the government immediately recognized the usefulness of 
colleges and universities as excellent training grounds for the men it 
would need to fight the War. 
In the spirit of the times, the leaders of colleges and 
universities struggled to determine how they might be of service to 
their country.  On August 2, 1917, the NCAA’s Executive Committee 
met in Washington, D.C. to devise a plan for athletics during the war 
era.159  The location facilitated the attendance of President Wilson’s 
Secretary of War, Newton Baker.160  Speaking at that session, Baker 
praised the athletics programs of colleges and universities and 
credited them with providing men fit for and easily adaptable to 
military life.161  However, he urged colleges and universities to 
broaden their reach and to require physical exercise of every 
student.162 
It is to the colleges that the country looks to maintain the steady flow of youths 
with preliminary training that best fits for the career of an officer.  It is highly 
important that the college athletic program be continued to equip young men for 
the reception of military training.  To attract young men to the colleges, nothing is 
 
 158. In one exception, a speaker at the 1914 Convention argued that the US might 
actually profit from the war, given the reduction in European trade, but that such easily 
won prosperity could further weaken US citizenry, even as the War increased the courage 
and endurance of Europeans. C.W. Savage, The Professional Versus the Educational in 
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their institutions physically, morally, and intellectually fit.  Id.  For a fascinating account of 
World War I, including a war timeline, maps, text, key documents and video clips see First 
World War.com, Multimedia History of World War One, http://www.firstworldwar.com (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2006). 
 159. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N 20-21 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 
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more important than the continuation of athletic sports, and I trust there will be 
no suggestion of the abandonment of college athletics because of the fear of lack of 
decorum.163 
Baker noted other ways that the direction of intercollegiate 
athletics was not entirely consistent with the army’s goals.164  Noting 
that institutions too often seek to develop men who were already big 
and strong, Baker argued for athletics training for all – or at least all 
young college men.165 
 There is one criticism that I have often felt constrained to make regarding 
college athletics, and that is that the wrong men are developed.  The big strong 
men are taken and much attention is lavished upon them so that they are 
developed into specialized athletes, while the weak and anemic are left to play the 
part of observers. Gentlemen, there are not enough star athletes in the colleges to 
fill our armies.  What the nation requires is that all our young men attending 
school shall have the benefit of physical training so as to develop their bodies and 
make them proper material for filling the armies of the country in the present 
emergency.166 
Baker’s concern was immediate.  Once the War began, more than one-
third of young men called and otherwise eligible would be found 
physically unfit for military service. 
In December of 1917, just in time for the NCAA’s meeting that 
year, Baker would again write to the NCAA and praise the worth of 
collegiate athletic training and again urge that athletics should not be 
limited to the few, but that participation should be widespread and 
available to the student body at large.167  To his letter would be added 
one by the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, who also praised 
the role of colleges and university athletic programs in preparing 
young men for military training.168 
At the December, 1917 convention, the full NCAA formally 
adopted the recommendations made earlier by its Executive 
Committee at the Washington meeting: 
 RESOLVED; That we recommend to all educational institutions, collegiate and 
secondary: 
 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 50. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 50; see also Frederic A. Woll, 2d Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, 
at 24 (mentioning conference and attempts to be consistent with Executive Committee 
recommendations); C.D. Coons, 5th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 26 (same); 
Roger H. Motten, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 34 (same). 
 167. Palmer E. Pierce, President’s Address, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 50-51 
(letter from Newton D. Baker). 
 168. Id. at 51-52. 
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 First. That athletic sports be made subservient to the work of military 
preparation, and be made therefore an essential factor in military training. 
 Second. That intercollegiate and interscholastic schedules be arranged for so 
long a time and so far as national and local conditions permit, and that all possible 
encouragement be given to the development of intramural sports, with a view to 
promoting the participation of all students. 
 Third.  That professional coaching and the expenses incidental thereto be 
reduced to a minimum. 
 Fourth.  That there be no pre-season coaching or practice, no scouting, except 
at a public intercollegiate contest, and no training table. 
 Fifth.  That the number of officials at intercollegiate games and their fees be 
kept as low as possible. 
 And further be it RESOLVED: That this Association reaffirms its belief in the 
eligibility rules which it has already endorsed, including the freshman rule, and 
therefore recommends that there be no lowering of eligibility standards during the 
present crisis.169 
Every program speaker at the 1917 convention focused upon the 
institutions’ and the NCAA’s roles in the War effort.170 
Beyond encouraging the colleges to offer athletics training to 
all young men, the government also passed the National Defense Act 
of 1916.171  The act authorized civilian rifle clubs under the control of 
the National Rifle Association in cooperation with the U.S. War 
Department, thus facilitating the formation of campus rifle clubs.172  
At its December 1917 convention, the NCAA formally recommended 
that colleges and universities throughout the United States adopt 
military rifle shooting, “under the regulations of the National Board 
for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, approved by the Secretary of 
War.”173  Some schools had taken this step well before the resolution 
 
 169. Evening Session Minutes, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 43. 
 170. See Palmer E. Pierce, President’s Address, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 47-
52; William H.P. Faunce, Athletics for the Service of the Nations, in 1917 PROC., supra note 
159, at 52-58; Dr. Joseph E. Raycroft, Training Camp Activities, in 1917 PROC., supra note 
159, at 59-65; Dr. McKenzie’s Address, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 70-73; W.P. 
Reeves, The Adoption of Military Rifle Shooting as an Intercollegiate Sport, in 1917 PROC., 
supra note 159, at 73-75.   
 171. Ch. 134, 64 Pub. L. No. 85, 39 Stat. 166 (1916) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 32 U.S.C.).  The Act is credited with federalizing the National Guard.  
39 Stat. at 197.  
 172. 39 Stat. at 211.   
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was passed.174  In the face of war and calls from the government for 
support, a number of schools even began to impose such training as a 
curricular requirement.175 
The War Department also created a Commission on Training 
Camp Activities.  The Commission secured some of the leading men in 
the field of amateur athletics to work along with the military in 
devising athletic programs for the enlisted men stationed at various 
military training camps.176  Walter Camp, for example, headed up the 
Navy’s Training Camp Activities.177  At the December 1917 NCAA 
Convention, Camp called on institutions to allow the military to 
approach leading coaches and trainers to seek their service at the 
military’s training camps saying “this is one of the big things that the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association can do” to support the war 
effort.178 Schools also scheduled games against the teams of these 
various military training camps.179 
Across the country, student athletes responded to their nation’s 
call by enlisting.  The war decimated many college and university 
teams.  As a result, powerhouses Harvard, Princeton and Yale 
completely ceased their intercollegiate athletics programs.  Harvard’s 
 
 174. Hollon A. Farr, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1916 PROC., supra note 39, at 9-10 (noting 
discussion of subject among New England Schools); see also W.P. Reeves, The Adoption of 
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intercollegiate sport). 
 175. W.L. Driver, 7th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 32 (noting nine 
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Le Baron Briggs, then Dean of Harvard College’s Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences, informed the NCAA that the athletic department felt, as did 
Harvard’s president, “that intercollegiate games are out of place now, 
and that the continuance of them would lessen the emphasis on things 
military.”180  But Briggs also admitted that Harvard had suffered a 
significant loss of athletes to the military and was threatened at any 
time with losing more to active duty. 
Practically all our men from Varsity squads are gone or are subject to immediate 
call.  At any time we may hear that men who were closely associated with them 
have been killed.  Our bigger games, those with Yale and Princeton, have been 
great public spectacles such as we do not like to be responsible for in times like 
these.181 
Briggs provided the NCAA with a copy of a report that he had written 
for Harvard’s president explaining the department’s decision. 
[T]he University teams as we have known them in recent years do not exist to-day.  
The college has been severely blamed for suspending intercollegiate athletics.  
Intercollegiate athletics in any recognizable sense of the name had become 
impossible and almost unimaginable. The spirit that makes a man an athlete 
makes him at the very first call of his country a soldier; and when war was 
declared, our games with Yale, which had seemed the most important events of 
life, became in a moment unrealities, to which no earnest man in a university team 
or crew could give serious thought.  Practically all our athletes who did not enlist 
as volunteers gave themselves up to intensive military study and practice, till in 
the summer all but two of seventy-nine men in the University football squads were 
in some form of national service, or in training for it.182 
Responding to those who said that Harvard should simply reconstitute 
its teams with more players, since most of its rivals were similarly 
crippled, Briggs said that while he viewed it as Harvard’s duty to 
encourage sports, “in these times military training comes before 
athletics, and claims more than divided allegiance.”183  He added that 
spectacles such as the big football games with Yale and Princeton “are 
unbecoming now, when the friends and comrades of the participants 
are at the front, or on their way to it, and in imminent danger of a 
soldier’s death.”184 
Yale asserted a similar approach once the United States 
entered the War: 
At the declaration of war last spring all intercollegiate schedules were cancelled 
and nearly every “Y” man and every undergraduate manager entered some form of 
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military service.  At the opening of the fall term we made an attempt, which has 
proved successful so far, to make athletic training an efficient factor in our military 
establishment.  It seemed to our Board of Athletic Control that athletics could 
perform an important military function, and those in charge of military matters 
here at Yale have cooperated heartily with us.  Three days a week have been 
devoted to foot drill and three to various forms of athletic spots.  It was decided 
further that membership on teams participating in intercollegiate contests should 
be confined to members of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps [ROTC] and the 
Naval Training Unit.185 
Yale continued with intercollegiate games for freshman teams and 
also sponsored informal teams and intramural games.186 
As both Yale and Harvard’s reports indicate, many supporters 
of intercollegiate athletics were none too pleased at their decisions to 
discontinue intercollegiate sports.  And with competitive juices 
flowing, some challenged the nobility of the Harvard, Princeton and 
Yale approaches, saying that these schools were hiding athletic 
infirmities under the guise of patriotism, preferring not to play than to 
lose badly.187 
While all suffered losses, the large majority of schools took the 
approach of cutting back on intercollegiate athletic programs without 
totally ending them.  As a result, the rule barring freshmen from 
varsity teams became a war casualty.188  Harvard, Yale and Princeton 
aside, other New England schools continued playing football.  
Wesleyan argued that if athletics had value during peacetime, they 
certainly had value during wartime.189  Amherst argued that athletics 
provided much needed diversion from the seriousness of military 
training.190  Brown argued that continuing intercollegiate athletics, 
though at a reduced level, was its “patriotic duty.”191  Explaining its 
use of freshmen on varsity teams, Dartmouth said it could not justify 
the expense of separate freshman teams during wartime, but vowed to 
return to the “freshman rule” once the War was over.192 
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The War also had financial consequences for campuses 
committed to athletic programs.  Pacific Coast Schools argued that if 
intercollegiate athletics fell, so would intramurals, for the latter were 
largely supported by gate receipts of the former.  They did, however, 
agree to a lowering of gate fees.193 
In 1917, Congress raised an additional concern by imposing a 
War Tax on admissions at amusement events, which presumably 
included athletic events.  State educational institutions were covered 
by an express exemption for state entities; however, private 
institutions were not so protected.  The tax posed a new threat to their 
already diminishing wartime gate receipts.  The NCAA used its new 
relationship with the government to negotiate an exemption for 
educational athletics.194 
B.  The SATC’s 
Apart from encouraging student enlistment, the greatest 
contribution that colleges and universities made to the war effort 
came in 1918 with the introduction of the Student Army Training 
Corps (“SATC”).195  The military was in great need of more soldiers, 
particularly soldiers with the attributes that would make good 
officers; and colleges and universities had a full well of such men.196  
At the same time, massive student withdrawals and enlistments 
threatened the stability of educational institutions.  To address these 
concerns, the War Department’s Committee on Education and Special 
Training established the SATC program on hundreds of campuses 
across the nation.197 
The deal was simple enough.  All schools with 1,000 or more 
students would surrender their campuses as military training 
 
 193. A.D. Browne, 9th Dist. Rep., in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 35-36. 
 194. E.g., Evening Session, in 1917 PROC., supra note 159, at 44 (questioning 
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grounds.198  They would encourage their male students (and the 
government would later require them) to enlist in the army.199 
Training for these enlisted men would be provided on the campuses 
under the supervision of Army personnel, who would be based on 
site.200  In return, the army would provide the institution with a fixed 
amount of money per soldier.201  The SATC program put military 
training front and center on university campuses.  NYU, for example, 
trained military men in both traditional education courses as well as 
vocational ones.202  Its approach was typical of schools in the day, as 
described in this excerpt from a report on the program written by the 
NYU library staff: 
 At NYU, Captain [later Major] William S. Maulsby was the military program 
commander, and Charles Snow, dean of the College of Engineering, was the 
civilian director of the National Army Training Detachment. Fifteen committees, 
made up of faculty and staff of the university, were appointed to administer 
specific areas. The school agreed to provide the soldier with instruction, food, and 
quarters. The government, in turn, agreed to reimburse the university a fixed 
amount per soldier. 
 The first group of soldiers arrived on April 11 and, together with later 
inductees, received instruction in such trades as auto mechanics, blacksmiths, 
carpenters, chauffeurs, concrete workers, electricians, machinists, and radio 
operators. During a two month period, the men received training in their trade, 
military instruction and, beginning in July, a course on “War Issues.” 
 At the beginning of the fall semester, 524 institutions enrolled about 140,000 
men into SATC units. At that time, the National Army Training Detachments were 
absorbed into SATC as Section B vocationals. In all, between April 11 and 
demobilization on December 19, 1918, 1,613 men took part in this section at NYU. 
 NYU agreed to accept 2,000 men. The NYU SATC unit eventually enrolled 
1,564 student-soldiers in two divisions: 1,288 at University Heights and 276 at 
University and Bellevue Hospital Medical College. . . . 
 . . . [T]he collegiate or Section A SATC students were required to fulfill the 
requirements for college admission and to be accepted as matriculated students by 
the school. Inducted as privates in the regular army and subject to military 
discipline, the student-soldiers lived in barracks, ate at mess and were accorded a 
 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
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monthly allowance of $30, in addition to having their tuition paid. They were to 
receive a total of 42 hours of “essential” and “allied” subjects while also performing 
military drill for 11 hours per week. Essential courses included “military law and 
practice,” “hygiene and sanitation,” “surveying and map making,” “modern 
ordinance,” and the “war issues” course. At the end of their studies [between one 
and three terms, depending on age] the students were assigned to officer or non-
commissioned officer training programs, a depot brigade, or permitted further 
study in engineering, medicine, or law.203 
The impact of the SATC’s is clearly reflected in NCAA 
Proceedings for 1918. At that convention NCAA Vice President 
Samuel Beyer (Iowa State), addressing the 1918 convention in the 
absence of Palmer Pierce, noted the schools’ contributions with pride, 
saying most colleges had “turned their plants over to the Federal 
authorities,” and that “[a]thletics became a part of the military 
establishment.”204  As the above excerpt explains, however, the 
transition from civilian educational campus to military training center 
was not without its problems.  Intercollegiate athletics—and in some 
cases, ordinary athletics in general—were brought to a virtual 
standstill on America’s college and university campuses as military 
training took precedence.  And although the NCAA’s 1917 resolution 
urged that eligibility standards not be lowered, institutions were 
forced to abandon eligibility rules, such as amateurism requirements, 
because many of the military’s prospects could not meet them, and it 
was felt that the military’s expressed needs should override such 
rules.205 
The SATC’s also changed campus life for all students 
dramatically.  While affirming their patriotism, leaders of 
intercollegiate athletics often referred to the impact of the SATC’s as 
demoralizing for students, faculty and staff.206  Support for this view is 
also reflected in a report prepared by the Penn State library on the 
program at that campus. 
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 The SATC snuffed out the remnants of student social life at Penn State. 
Undergraduates had to wear uniforms at all times and observe military 
regulations just as they would at any other military base. To meet the demand for 
additional living quarters, fraternity houses were converted to barracks, two new 
barracks were erected on Old Beaver Field, and a mess hall was built adjacent to 
McAllister Hall. A rigidly prescribed schedule governed daily activities, with 
students rising promptly at 7:00 A.M., marching to and from classes and meals, 
and observing a strict 8:30 P.M. curfew. While this routine bore only an 
approximate resemblance to real military life-surely most troops on active duty did 
not enjoy the luxury of a seven o’clock reveille-and was well insulated from the 
horrors of combat, it did make freshman customs seem downright childish by 
comparison. Among the five hundred undergraduates disqualified from the SATC 
(that is, female students and males who did not pass the physical exam), green 
dinks and ribbons disappeared as quickly as the old taboo prohibiting freshmen 
from walking on the grass. Compulsory attendance at daily and Sunday chapel was 
also discontinued for the first time in the College’s history.207 
Friction developed between campus leadership and military 
officials over who should be in charge on campuses.  The matter 
reached such a point that, after the War, some colleges resisted plans 
to establish Reserve Officers Training Corps (“ROTC”) units on their 
campuses.  To quell the rising storm, the military sent a 
representative to the NCAA to express its interest in making changes 
to alleviate any of the schools’ concerns.208 
As if relegating their campuses to military control were not 
enough, the worldwide flu pandemic of 1918 made matters worse for 
students and supporters of intercollegiate athletics.  The pandemic 
caused hundreds of thousands of deaths worldwide.209  In the United 
States, state health authorities outlawed or limited athletic events 
like football games for fear that they might lead to a spread of the 
disease.210  The flu epidemic, coupled with the changes wrought by the 
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War, spelled disaster for all but the most modest campus athletic 
programs.211 
C.  Recovering from War 
While no one wanted war, some saw a silver lining, suggesting 
that World War I offered an opportunity to remedy the evils of 
intercollegiate athletics.  The president of Brown University, William 
Faunce, argued that the war was offering a “priceless opportunity for 
appraisement and revision,” a chance to strip away the extravagant 
approaches that have led to abuse and criticism.212  While stressing 
the need to reinforce eligibility rules, he also argued for a model of 
universal participation.  “The army has no interest in developing a few 
Samsons or Sandows.  It is interested in a campaign to develop every 
man in the line.”213  Harvard’s LeBaron Briggs opined that if colleges 
“fail to reduce the expense of coaching and training, to inculcate 
notions less luxurious, and to foster a better understanding of the 
relation between athletics and other interests of life, we shall lose one 
of the opportunities so dearly bought by this war.”214 
Addressing the December 1918 convention, Dean J.R. Angell, 
then of the University of Chicago (later president of Yale) also saw the 
War’s end as an opportunity, saying that “now the critical moment has 
come when we must decide whether the old system, compact, as it 
was, of good and evil, shall be revived, or whether instead we shall try 
to build a bigger, better, and more enduring one.”215  Angell then 
proceeded to offer what he called his “Brief Confession of Faith in 
Matters Athletic,” listing what he deemed the essentials of a solidly 
amateur intercollegiate athletics program.216  In addition to calling for 
an end to training tables, he stated: 
 I believe that the chief aim of college athletics should be the physical and moral 
improvement of the entire group . . . rather than the production of a few highly 
trained semi-professionals . . . . 
 . . . . 
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 I believe that amateurism is an absolute essential to wholesome college games 
and that it means high-minded love of gentlemanly sport for its own sake. 
 I believe that professionalism consists of a spirit, a point of view . . . .  Men who 
play for motives other than the love of the game, men to whom victory, however 
won, is the controlling end, are men already on the road to professionalism, men 
who have in some measure sacrificed their amateurism. 
 I believe that a good deal of the professional training of athletic teams, 
particularly in football, has been grossly objectionable in overworking boys whose 
primary obligation is to the academic aims of the college.  The result has often been 
that the boy has done neither job well – has been too exhausted to study and too 
much disturbed at his class deficiencies to put his whole spirit into the games. 
 I believe that any system [that allowed] proselyting among boy athletes in 
secondary schools is pernicious . . . . 
 . . . I believe that high-priced temporary coach is inimical to the development of 
a permanently high tone in the athletic affairs of a college . . . . 
 . . . I do not believe there is any obligation on the part of the college to furnish 
the general public with substitutes for the circus, the prize fight, and the 
gladiatorial combat. 
 . . . I do not believe that there are convincing statistics to prove the supposed 
advertising value of successful athletic teams . . . . 
 I do not believe the possible benefit gained by a few men trained for spectacular 
contests is an adequate offset for the time and money invested, the distortion of 
social and educational values, both inside and outside the college, and the 
unequivocal loss to the mass of undergraduates arising from the concentration of 
interest in the athletic exploitation of a favored few.217 
Angell further argued that, “both in the legal and in the moral sense of 
the word,” athletics was frequently being controlled by those outside 
the institutions.218 
Certainly, the War offered supporters an opportunity to tout 
the value of athletics and its appropriate place in a school’s regular 
curriculum.  By exposing so many undergraduate males to physical 
education, it secured converts to the gospel of physical fitness.  Vice-
President Beyers noted in 1918 that athletes tended to be less subject 
to diseases.  “It is a matter of common knowledge that the army and 
navy authorities were inclined to place college athletes in a preferred 
class as officer material.”219  It stood to reason, he said, that when the 
 
 217. Id. at 46-48. 
 218. Id. at 48. 
 219. S.W. Beyer, The Vice President’s Address, in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 37. 
 
  
256 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW  [Vol. 8:2:211 
 
war ended trades, industries and professions would be equally 
discriminating.220 
Upon the end of the war, features of collegiate athletics deemed 
objectionable again reared their heads.  Hoping to mend its tattered 
blanket of eligibility rules, the NCAA passed resolutions reaffirming 
its pre-War positions: 
Resolved, That the Association reaffirms its previous resolution, that seasonal 
coaches, scouting (except at public intercollegiate contests), training tables, 
organized training or coaching in the summer vacation, and post-season games are 
menaces to the spirit of amateur college athletics, and are contrary to the aims of 
this Association.221 
But not all were convinced that schools were taking advantage 
of the new opportunity to reform athletics.  A year later, in 1920, the 
reporter for the Second District argued that the prevailing situation 
was worse than when the NCAA was first formed: 
We still have the seasonal coach; this is a mild abuse . . . .  Pre-season training, 
training camps, and summer camps are the rule and not the exception.  The extent 
of the training table is governed only by the size of the bank account . . . .  Scouts 
looking among the preparatory schools for material are numerous and active, and 
their “offers” to desirable boys range from a “scholarship” up through “tuition,” 
“board and room,” “books and clothes,” “spending money,” to a flat salary of so 
much per annum.  There are cases in the minds of each one of you of men 
migrating from one college to another.  These travelers are very often good 
athletes.  They seem to go from a college of more moderate financial means to one 
more blest . . . .  There is no use dealing in particulars or going farther into 
conditions . . . .  To say we are back to conditions existing when this organization 
first started is covering the truth.222 
This speaker opined that these problems would continue “as long as 
there is an income at the gate.”223 
In contrast, others argued the post-War period was an 
opportunity to exploit intercollegiate athletics further to the good of 
the programs and their institutions.  The Ninth District’s reporter 
offered a rosy picture in 1920, asserting that scouting at secondary 
schools had been eliminated, that there was “entire accord” on 
eligibility rules, and that there were “flourishing conditions within the 
[west] coast colleges” and “the most cordial good will and co[o]peration 
on the part of the public.”224  He further noted that, assisted by the 
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addition of paved roads, “The public interest in college athletics, 
which, during the war, lapsed so completely that the contests could no 
longer be financed, has now brought out larger crowds than before the 
war.”225  He heralded, as well, the great success of Rose Bowl games. 
IV.  SEGREGATION AND ATHLETICS “FOR MEN” 
Up to this point, the focus of this article has been upon what 
was discussed in the early NCAA proceedings.  But it is worthy to note 
what was not discussed.  One finds little discussion of minorities or 
women.  The primary aim of the NCAA’s founders, like the aim of so 
many leaders of that time, was to satisfy the needs of the young white 
males who they envisioned would be the country’s leaders. 
Though not inevitable, these approaches were a product of the 
times.  Until the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in August 
1920, women could not vote and were denied other citizenry rights.  
But the War pressed women into new decision-making positions at 
home, and in the workplace.  After the War ended in 1918, the 
movement for women’s rights gained new steam. Among the targets of 
that agitation were institutions that belonged to the NCAA.  In his 
1922 convention report, one district reporter commented that there 
was widespread and sustained interest in women’s athletics programs 
in his district, and he hoped that the NCAA would take the matter up.  
This agitation was likely increased by the fact that other groups, 
including NCAA’s then nemesis, the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), 
had opened their events to women and minorities, and also to the 
formation of the National Amateur and Athletic Federation, whose 
goal was to put women and men’s athletic programs on equal 
footing.226 
Still, the NCAA was resistant.  The only hints that the NCAA 
was open to expanding women’s participation in sports are oblique 
references to alliances that might be formed with amateur sports 
organizations that welcomed women, including groups like the Young 
Women’s Christian Association, the National Amateur Athletic 
Federation (which had a men’s and women’s division) and, on 
occasion, the AAU.227  There were no women in the NCAA leadership; 
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they were not represented among the delegates attending the 
convention; they were not represented in significant numbers among 
the faculty of these bodies, not to mention their athletics staffs; nor 
did they occupy significant positions in the governmental bodies that 
might press change.  Occasionally, sympathetic actors in the 
predominantly male sports media would run an article or two about 
successful sportswomen, but generally notice of or interest in women’s 
involvement in sports was few and far between.228 
Of course, the resistance to women’s involvement in athletics 
was not only from men.  As calls for more female sports participation 
increased, even some women joined arguments that competition and 
vigorous activity were not feminine and that participation in athletics 
might be physically harmful to the female body.229  In 1938, the 
director of New York State’s Department of Education, who also was 
the chair of the State’s Physical Education Association, barred 
interschool competition for girls at New York public schools.  He 
established an all female commission to protect the perceived feminine 
traits of girls against the perils of “too vigorous a sports program.”  
Not everyone agreed with this approach, however, and he complained 
that commercial and community interests were impeding the work of 
protecting girls from the dangers of competition.230 
Lest the reader think that resistance within the NCAA to 
including women in its intercollegiate athletics championships was 
limited to a narrow earlier period, it should be noted that the NCAA 
would retain its male-only position for a number of years, even as its 
individual institutions began to dramatically broaden their women’s 
sports programs.  In 1964, the NCAA’s executive committee rejected a 
call from women’s groups and their own long range planning 
committee to include women’s sports in their championship events, 
issuing the following regulation: “The games committee shall limit 
participation to eligible male athletes.”231  The NCAA Council set up a 
committee to meet with women’s sports groups to discuss how women 
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could take advantage of some of the benefits offered by the NCAA.232  
Four years later in 1968, the NCAA joined with Chevrolet Motor 
Division to sponsor the first “College Football Centennial Queen” 
contest.  Each major conference was to select a candidate for “queen” 
to be voted upon by fans.233  The December issue also featured a 
spread with pictures of and a short write-up about each candidate for 
queen.234 
Things would remain the same at the NCAA until Congress 
passed Title IX in 1972.  In light of that statute, and upon advice of 
legal counsel, the NCAA rescinded its rule prohibiting female athletes 
from competing in NCAA-sponsored events.  That same year, the first 
female competed in a NCAA Championship, the NCAA’s National 
Swimming and Diving Championship.  But separate championships 
for women would not be created until 1981.235  Today, of course, while 
many would argue there is still much to be accomplished, female 
participation in NCAA sports is widespread. 
Minority student athletes were also denied opportunities in the 
early years of the NCAA.  Despite the fact that the first NCAA 
constitution provided that “[a]ll Colleges and Universities in the 
United States” were eligible for membership in the association,236 
minority colleges had a difficult time joining the NCAA.  No 
historically black institutions were among its original members, even 
though, as noted earlier, historically African American Howard 
University was an early participant in NCAA conferences as a visitor.  
Black teams and white teams that had black players also had to deal 
with state “Jim Crow” laws barring blacks from certain public places 
and prohibiting blacks and whites from playing together.  Even when 
interracial play was not barred by law, white schools, teams, or 
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coaches sometimes refused to play if it meant they had to play with or 
against black players.237  In the first quarter of its existence, the 
NCAA ignored the problems that racial discrimination posed for 
intercollegiate athletes.  Athletics for all did not really mean athletics 
for everyone.  The AAU, by contrast, took a very different stance, 
advocating equal opportunity and sponsoring championships for teams 
at minority educational institutions.238 
Unable to find widespread acceptance among the memberships 
of the white conferences black institutions combined to form their own 
Colored Intercollegiate Athletic Association (“CIAA”) in 1912, which 
was based at Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute (later 
Hampton University).239  They also began to sponsor their own meets 
and championships.240  The CIAA became a conference member of the 
NCAA in 1921,241 and in 1924, Howard University became the first 
historically black college elected to individual membership.242  These 
admissions did not, however, compel NCAA member institutions to 
compete against them. 
Another predominantly minority institution, the Carlisle 
Indian School, did from time to time attract the NCAA’s attention.  
Carlisle was the nation’s first off-reservation federally supported 
school for Indians.  Its most famous athlete is Jim Thorpe, who won 
both the decathlon and the pentathlon at the 1912 Olympic Games.  
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Carlisle was not a college-level institution, but the athletic skill of its 
students, often led to competitions against college teams and led 
colleges to recruit its students.  When Carlisle students entered 
college, some argued that they should be treated as if they had played 
collegiate athletics for a year, thus reducing their eligibility, or even 
possibly subjecting them to transfer rules requiring them to sit out a 
year.243 
V. THE “THREAT” OF THE PROFESSIONAL GAME 
While the end of the War brought a return to college football, it 
also brought a new threat: professional football.  Semi-professional 
and professional football teams had been around for some time, but 
the formation of the American Professional Football Association (later 
the “National Football League”) in 1920 was backed by big money and, 
thus, introduced a new era.  Smaller leagues did not completely 
disappear, however.  In fact, even the American Legion conducted a 
professional football program.244  In response, critics from the NCAA 
complained that professionalism was being conducted under the guise 
of patriotism.245 
Leaders of big time athletic programs at NCAA schools 
generally wanted no professionalism of the sport.  Of course, there was 
some concern that the existence of professional leagues might affect 
the amateur spirit at college games or even lead collegians to accept 
pay in order to enhance their skills at the college level.  Noting that 
the only source from which professional teams could pull their players 
were collegiate teams, Charles Kennedy argued that the NCAA should 
“put themselves on record against the professionalizing of football.”246  
But the opposition to professional football was much broader than just 
a concern for amateurism.  First, there was the social concern that, 
irrespective of its effect upon amateur sports, professional athletics 
would introduce undesired social evils.  But second, and some would 
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say most importantly, was another reason.  Some colleges were 
steeped in debt obligations that supported stadium building and other 
expenses, and were still under great pressure from alumni and the 
public to continue their intercollegiate athletic programs.  Many 
schools feared a frightening financial hit if professional athletics lured 
fans and, even worse, star collegiate players, away from the college 
game.247  Some individuals no doubt feared for their jobs.  It was in the 
financial interest of the NCAA, member schools, and the 
administrators of intercollegiate athletics to stop professional football. 
In 1919, the NCAA adopted a resolution stating that anyone 
who participated in a professional game “either during their college 
course or after leaving college” would forfeit his college letters.248  In 
1921, it organized the College Football Coaches Association—open 
solely to coaches at NCAA member schools—which at its first official 
meeting issued a resolution condemning the professional game and 
vowing to stop it: 
Be it hereby resolved that it is the sense of the American Football Coaches 
Association that professional football is detrimental to the best interests of 
American football and American youth.  It is further resolved that football coaches 
lend their influence to the discouragement of professional football, and be it further 
resolved that football coaches hereby heartily second the policy and stand of the 
Western Intercollegiate Conference on professional football, and be it further 
resolved, that the coaches recommend that football officials who officiate at 
professional football games be not allowed to officiate at college contests.249 
As the resolution indicated, the conferences also put their weight 
against the professional game.250 
That these groups did not consider these actions to stop the 
professional game a possible violation of the antitrust laws may be a 
reflection of the times.  The following year the Supreme Court decided 
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the infamous Federal Baseball case, which determined that 
professional baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce and 
therefore could not be sued under the antitrust laws.251  Many, 
including this writer, have argued that the case reflected a view of 
baseball (and sports) as not being a true business, i.e., it was a game 
and not the type of thing that antitrust laws were intended to affect. 
252 
The kitchen grew hotter when, at the end of his final collegiate 
season, Red Grange signed with a professional team for a reported 
$100,000, and Ernie Nevers went pro shortly thereafter.253  These 
signings evoked a range of opinions.  Some argued that the teamwork 
needed in the college program was impossible if athletes were aspiring 
to ultimate professional glory.  Arguing for the adoption of some sort 
of rule, one news editor argued that without one, fans would not know 
whether a college player was playing for the love of the game or for 
“grand stand glory that will get him a fat contract along about 
Thanksgiving [D]ay.”254  That writer claimed that the latter 
alternative would lead to a “withering of college enthusiasm” and an 
end to the college football spirit.255  However, not all onlookers agreed 
that students should be barred from taking professional contracts 
after college play.  Famed commentator Will Rogers was not alone 
when he argued that the sole reason colleges feared the professional 
game was that it threatened their ability to make money on the backs 
of collegiate players. 256 
Some schools used the rise of the professional game and private 
control of sports to argue that intercollegiate football involvement 
should be increased.  In 1921, the reporter for the NCAA’s Ninth 
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District (the west coast) reported “some difficulty” in controlling the 
Rose Bowl games, but noted that rather than a policy of “hands off,” 
colleges needed to become intricately involved in regulating such 
events or face the possibility that they will fall into the hands of 
private enterprise. 257 
The NCAA saw the Grange incident as demonstrating the need 
for further action.  In 1925, it recommended that schools dismiss 
anyone who “may be at any time connected in any capacity with 
professional football” after September of 1926.258  NCAA President 
Palmer Pierce opined that he saw no problem with the development of 
both amateur and professional sports, “provided the two classes of 
sports can be kept separate.”259  By separate Pierce meant that 
student athletes should be discouraged from playing professional 
athletics, whether it be during or after graduation.260 
Under pressure from the amateur game and its supporters in 
January of 1926, the owners of professional football teams met in New 
York to discuss how to resolve this dispute with the colleges, the 
NCAA and the supporters of their product.261  Eventually, the far 
weaker professional leagues agreed not to touch college athletes until 
after the athlete’s high school or college class had graduated, whether 
or not the athlete himself did.262  This rule was the earliest ancestor of 
the notorious “three year” rule that was the center of litigation in 
Clarett v. NFL.263  Of course, the rule offered some benefits to the 
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league, as well.  It meant that players who came to them would be 
better-developed physically and mentally, without the expense of a 
minor league program.  It also meant continued good relations with 
the NCAA, member schools and conferences.  By 1926 an NCAA 
committee would report that the professional game did not “loom up 
as such a dire menace” as it did in 1925 and would express 
appreciation to pro teams for adopting rules that prohibited tampering 
with collegiate players.264 
VI. THE “THREAT” OF THE MEDIA 
Early on, the NCAA leadership was keenly aware of the 
media’s potential role in their success.  In 1907, President Palmer 
Pierce suggested that the NCAA could become “[a] central bureau of 
propaganda concerning college athletics” by employing, among other 
approaches, “newspaper statements of aims and policies” and 
“circulars and other published literature.”265  In 1909, the NCAA’s 
president called for greater use of newspapers to get the Association’s 
story across to the public and to students.266  Certainly, the NCAA 
made sure that reports of its proceedings made their way into local 
newspapers.267  Of course, the media had its own mission.  Thus, the 
relationship in each party’s eyes, was necessary, but troubled. 
The print press dominated coverage in the NCAA’s early years.  
Newspaper editors angered some NCAA operatives by deciding to 
select and announce a “national champion” in football and by their 
selection of All-American teams. 268  However, NCAA member schools 
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were complicit in these arrangements because their coaches, often 
provided information to the press from which the selections were 
made.269 
As press coverage increased, so did fan appeal, and vice versa. 
By the late 1920’s radio made live play-by-play coverage available to 
many more fans.  In 1928, NBC Radio planned to carry sixteen games, 
beginning with Navy and Notre Dame.270  When the athletics board of 
the University of Iowa decided to end radio coverage of football games, 
claiming that it negatively affected fan attendance, the decision 
caused such an uproar that the board reversed themselves 
immediately.271 
The 1929 Carnegie Commission report on athletics 
summarized the prevailing arguments against the sports media.272  It 
was argued that media were professionalizing the amateur game by 
singling out coaches and athletes for special attention through 
interviews, special coverage, or awards.  Schools accused the media of 
sensationalizing negative sports news, such as deaths and injuries and 
resisting attempts to maintain amateurism by whipping up public 
opposition to institutional actions.  It is hard to say when the media 
was merely reporting public opinion or actually whipping it up.  
Probably, as today, they were doing a bit of both. 
It is clear that, while they did sensationalize at times, the 
media also kept NCAA institutions honest by offering a viewpoint that 
was different from that packaged by the institutions.  In 1909, the 
Washington Post conducted a survey that it claimed proved that the 
trend among schools was to minimize the dangers of football to avoid 
 
usually ingenious, if not sound”).  The University of Michigan library staff has compiled a 
history of “championship” designations that date back to 1901.  See Bentley Historical 
Library, University of Michigan Athletics History, National Championships, 
http://www.umich.edu/~bhl/athdept/football/misc/natchamp.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 
2006). 
 269. WM. R. Laporte, 8th Dist. Rep., in 1925 PROC., supra note 104, at 38 (district 
speaker complaining that newspapers were resisting efforts to better athletic programs by 
promoting the “spectacular rather than the educational” and asking for advice on how to 
handle bad publicity); see also Wikipedia, Walter Camp, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Camp (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (biography of Walter 
Camp noting that he may have suggested the selection of the first All-American team and 
certainly remained involved throughout his career). 
 270. 16 Big Games to be Covered on N.B.C. Chain, DECATUR HERALD, Oct. 7, 1928, 
at 10. 
 271. Heavy Protest Restores Radio Football News, TIMES RECORDER, (date and page 
unknown). 
 272. Howard J. Savage et al., American College Athletics, BULLETIN NO. 23, at 266-
90 (1929). 
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waning support. 273  As noted earlier, Will Rogers’s editorial was also 
key among those arguing that schools’ interest in preventing 
professional play was primarily financial.274  The media’s reports on 
football injuries no doubt spurred the public pressure that led even the 
most stubborn to reform.  And despite the fact that much majority-run 
press denied the contributions of women and minorities, a few papers 
gave coverage.275 
Certainly, though, the press was not always constructively 
critical of intercollegiate athletics.  Far more often than it was 
witnessed challenging the proponents of commercialization and 
exploitation, the media was found in bed with them.  Arguably, the 
press also facilitated the exploitation of which they complained, 
serving up full vials of euphoric media exposure, enough to make an 
impressionable student-athlete forget about the academic 
shortcomings that would surely cripple him after the cheering 
stopped. 
VII. OLYMPICS, PHYSICAL FITNESS, RULES, AND CHAMPIONSHIPS 
After the War, the NCAA faced a number of other issues.  It 
began to take advantage of its new relationship with the government, 
lobbying federal and state authorities for support of physical 
education in the nation’s schools.276  It formed coalitions with groups 
advocating physical fitness, such as the YMCA.  It also put its weight 
behind the federal Fess-Capper bill that offered federal money to 
states to establish physical education programs in schools.277 
The NCAA was also intricately involved in the formation of 
what ultimately became the U.S. Olympic Committee.  After the War, 
the federal government strongly pushed amateur athletics groups to 
form a single national organization to advance America’s interests in 
the Olympics.  In 1920, the NCAA agreed to engage in discussions 
 
 273. For Sane Football, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1909 (claiming trend is for institutional 
leaders to minimize game’s dangers). 
 274. Will Rogers, Red Grange Chose the Better Part, LINCOLN SUNDAY STAR, Dec. 6, 
1925, at 4. 
 275. E.B. Henderson, Howard Had Great Team, WASH. POST , Dec. 13, 1908, at 6 
(noting Howard’s success despite obstacles and school not receiving its share of news 
coverage); see also discussion accompanying notes 226-235 discussing female athletes.  
 276. See, e.g., Rep. of Special Comm., in 1920 PROC., supra note 222, at 42-45. 
 277. See id.; Comm. on the Fess Capper Bill, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 52-53; 
Miscellaneous Business., in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 61-63 (National Physical 
Education Service thanking NCAA for support and reporting on progress on Fess-Capper 
bill). 
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with other groups to form such an association, however, the NCAA’s 
ongoing feud with the AAU almost got in the way of its involvement.  
Eventually, those involved reached a power sharing agreement.278 
The NCAA also became a major promulgator of rules and 
sponsor of championships.  By the end of its first twenty-five years, it 
produced rules and/or sponsored national championships in thirteen 
sports: Football, Basketball, Baseball, Boxing, Fencing, Gymnastics, 
Hockey, Lacrosse, Soccer, Swimming, Track, Volleyball and Wrestling. 
VIII. CRACKS IN THE COALITION 
In the mid-1920s, the NCAA requested that the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching conduct an examination 
of American intercollegiate athletics programs.279  It seems that 
opponents of the growing commercialism in intercollegiate athletics 
saw the Carnegie Foundation as a friend whose critiques and 
recommendations might provide the kind of wake-up call that they, 
themselves, could not accomplish within the organization.280 
When it was finally published in 1929, Carnegie Bulletin No. 
23 issued a strong indictment of intercollegiate athletics programs, 
touching upon every controversy that had plagued the NCAA for its 
first quarter.281  A NCAA Committee established to study the 
Carnegie Bulletin agreed with much of what Bulletin 23 said.282  But 
despite the solidarity of the Committee, the NCAA as a whole was a 
house divided. 
The contrast in two district approaches revealed the problem 
early on.  The small New England schools of the First District—
 
 278. E.g., 1920 PROC., supra note 222, at 9 (voting to participate); Palmer E. Pierce, 
Comm. on the Proposed Olympic Ass’n, in 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 53-61 (complaining 
AAU had too much voting power in Olympic Association under constitution and discussing 
tensions between two organizations); 1921 PROC., supra note 75, at 61-63 (NCAA deciding 
not to participate unless constitution changed); Charles W. Kennedy, Presidential Address, 
in 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 85-88 (noting changes in Olympic Association Constitution 
that NCAA was able to secure and NCAA acceptance of invitation to join association). 
 279. Palmer E. Pierce, The Annual Presidential Address, in 1925 PROC., supra note 
104, at 87-88; Palmer E. Pierce, Presidential Address, in 1926 PROC., supra note 264, at 69-
70;  1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 13; C.W. Mendell, Rep. of Comm. to Study Carnegie 
Found. Bulletin. 23, in 1930 PROC., supra note 24, at 79 (noting report undertaken at 
NCAA request). 
 280. S.V. Sanford, 3d Dist. Rep., in 1928 PROC., supra note 115, at 31 (for further 
reform, NCAA needed to look to outside scholarly groups like Carnegie Foundation). 
 281. Savage, supra note 272, at 266-90.   
 282. C.W. Mendell, Rep. of Comm. to Study Carnegie Found. Bulletin. 23, in 1930 
PROC., supra note 24, at 79-84. 
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lacking Harvard, Yale and Princeton—generally supported the move 
away from intercollegiate athletics and toward intramurals.  In 1907, 
the district reported that a majority of its schools were in favor of “a 
movement looking toward the restriction of intercollegiate 
athletics.”283 
By contrast, the Pacific Coast schools in the Ninth District 
were dominated by large universities that depended upon 
governmental support of their athletics programs and had strong 
legislative conferences.  Speaking of intercollegiate program growth, 
in 1928 the Ninth District’s reporter stated that, “[c]ontrary to the 
attitude of some of our Eastern brethren, we are not alarmed by this . 
. . .”284 Moreover, the reporter added: 
 We fail to see a necessary inconsistency between large crowds and clean sport.  
As a matter of fact, we believe football attracts to a great extent because of its 
cleanliness.  We feel that most of the possible evils due to this increased interest 
are more than offset by three distinct advantages: First, the creation of a spirit of 
loyalty in our own large student bodies; second, the sustaining of the alumni’s 
interest in their alma mater; and finally, the awakening of the general public by 
their interest in athletics indirectly to a favorable attitude and consideration of 
education generally.285 
Rather than reducing intercollegiate athletics, the report 
noted, the problem was meeting the growing demand for it.  The result 
was the construction of two collegiate stadiums and over $1,000,000 
raised for the construction of a third, and “the construction of more is 
threatened by the various municipalities of the West or Pacific 
Coast.”286  Not surprisingly, the “Big Ten” schools of the Midwest 
shared the Pacific Coast institutions’ point of view regarding 
expansion. 
While individual educators certainly evidenced differences in 
approaches to amateurism, at the end of the day the difference 
between institutional approaches to intercollegiate athletics was not 
so much a difference in respect for amateurism as it was a reflection of 
the geography, history, politics and the culture of the regions that 
supported those institutions.  Intercollegiate athletics policy did not 
spring full-grown, but was the product of compromise between people 
with very different visions of the role amateurism should play in 
intercollegiate athletics. 
 
 283. H.D. Wild, 1st Dist. Rep., in 1907 PROC., supra note 2, at 7. 
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Consider, for example, that the West and the Midwest tended 
to have large, state supported institutions.  Their populations were 
spread out over broad expanses with very little mass transportation 
between communities and little industry.  By contrast, the Eastern 
institutions tended to be smaller and closer together with more 
privately supported institutions among them.  The populations 
surrounding eastern institutions also were denser, and thus able to 
support many different types of recreation.  State-supported 
institutions had to satisfy governments that provided their funding.  
In areas where other forms of recreation were scarce, governments 
actively supported and encouraged the development of intercollegiate 
athletics because the events were popular with the people, and 
governments felt they served a public purpose.  Perhaps, under the 
circumstances that confronted some of the large West Coast and 
Midwestern schools, educators did feel pressure to provide the public 
with an alternative to the circus, the prize fight or the gladiatorial 
combat, because such other large-scale recreation was not easily 
accessible.287  It seems that intercollegiate football first became king in 
places where there was not a lot of other big time organized 
recreation. 
Whatever the cause, the differences among NCAA members so 
much frustrated a Committee on Proper Administration of College 
Athletics in 1909 that it even proposed a realignment of colleges into 
completely separate organizations “according to their ideas,” one for 
amateur programs and one for professional.288  Said the Committee, 
Those that believe professional athletes may rightly have a place on a college team, 
and those that, becoming weary of lying students, see no remedy except to cease 
asking questions—let them seek each other in friendly rivalry. 
 On the other hand those colleges that will have amateur athletics or none – let 
them seek their kind.  Thus we will have two great national organizations and 
between two members of different groups let there be scheduled no athletic 
contests of any kind. Let the one group admit to its teams, if it wishes, principally 
those who outside of college and school grounds have had training and experience 
and become known as experts . . . .  Let it throw its teams wide open to 
professionals, with only residence and scholarship restrictions, or agonize with the 
problem of finding a point between semi-professionalism and wide-open 
professionalism, where students when sorely tempted by self-interest will not 
 
 287. See J.R. Angell, The Reconstruction Program for Physical Education in the 
Colleges, in 1918 PROC., supra note 204, at 47 (“I do not believe there is any obligation on 
the part of the college to furnish the general public with substitutes for the circus, the prize 
fight, and the gladiatorial combat.”).    
 288. Rep. of the Comm. on Proper Admin. of Athletics, in 1909 PROC., supra note 72, 
at 17. 
 
  
2006] THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 271 
 
falsify.  Let it welcome the well-developed poor boy, who, to get money to pay for 
his education, finds it needful to place his skill on exhibition for wages with 
summer baseball teams and let it thus establish conditions which finally and 
necessarily restrict membership on its teams to men of like experience, making 
college athletics for the amusement rather than the physical training of the many.  
Let the amateur group agonize with the problem of the deceitful collegian; let it say 
to the man who falsifies his record that he will surely suffer the same penalty as 
the man who cheats in examination or is guilty of other dishonesty, namely that he 
will be dishonorably dismissed from his institution.  One theory or the other would 
soon control all the colleges of the land and we would have peace.289 
The Committee was percipient in its recognition that the 
NCAA could not stand if it ignored the divisions in its own house.  At 
the December 1930 convention, NCAA President Charles W. Kennedy, 
then the president of Princeton University, tried again, calling for 
drastic changes in football including the reduction of schedules to not 
more than five or six games, an end to spring and summer vacation 
practices, and an end to “intersectional or national championships in 
football.”290  As to the latter, he said that colleges had no “true or 
natural interests” in such games.291 
That these comments came from Kennedy is ironic because his 
institution, Princeton, was among the football leaders invited to 
President Roosevelt’s October 1905 meeting to reform the game, and 
among those who formed the first Football Rules Committee.  Similar 
irony was reflected in the comments of James R. Angell who had then 
taken on the presidency at Yale, another Roosevelt invitee and FRE 
member: 
 In the present era of high-powered and somewhat commercialized athletics, it 
is difficult to recall that they grew out of the wholly informal sports and games of 
college students conducted originally for sheer fun and wholesome exercise, with 
no thought whatever of intercollegiate competition, which was a late and relatively 
casual outcome of these unorganized domestic amusements.292 
The context of these comments is also important.  Whether by 
fate or by institutional design, Harvard, Yale and Princeton never 
regained their status as football’s leaders.  The schools of the Big Ten 
and Pacific Coast forged ahead with southern schools soon to follow.  
It could be said that in such an environment, expressions of disfavor 
for intersectional contests were not as costly as they might have been 
in years past.  And yet, in fairness, both men had been consistent in 
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their views throughout their affiliation with NCAA and their rise to 
leadership at their institutions and within the NCAA represented a 
remarkable shift for those organizations. 
By 1932, smaller colleges sought separate discussion meetings 
at the NCAA national convention, noting that their concerns differed 
substantially from those of larger schools that also tended to have 
larger athletic programs.293  Such differences ultimately led the body 
to split into three NCAA “Divisions” in the 1970’s, separated largely 
by size of athletic program and intercollegiate athletics philosophy.294  
Division I schools are those with the largest athletic programs and the 
greatest number of sports and athletic scholarships.  Division II allows 
athletics scholarships, but has fewer and smaller programs.  Division 
III schools do not offer athletic scholarships and have much smaller 
intercollegiate athletics programs. 
For some time these divisions were tied together by a 
legislative structure that often required the support of all divisions for 
major action.  But that approach also began to wane, as the NCAA 
began to untangle the Divisions from each other by classifying 
legislation.  However, this was not enough.  In 1996, continuing 
differences among the divisions led to a historical restructuring effort 
that for all practical purposes made the three Divisions autonomous—
and gave the conferences renewed power.  The NCAA called its new 
plan a “federated” approach.  As I have argued elsewhere, by restoring 
significant autonomy to the divisions and the conferences, the NCAA 
came full circle, looking more like the group that it “severally agree[d]” 
it was when it first organized in 1905-06.295 
When we examine the status of the original members of the 
NCAA, it is easy to see that dissention followed that body through the 
years because of key differences in athletics philosophy that were 
present even at the body’s inception.  Today, seventeen of the original 
thirty-eight members are Division I schools and of those, ten have 
football programs classified as Division IA, the most competitive 
 
 293. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Athletic Budgets, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1932) [hereinafter 1932 PROC.] (noting the 
adoption of the roundtable format in 1931 and that smaller colleges sought separate 
meetings for the 1932 gathering). 
 294. See Historical Outline of Multidivision Classification, http://www1.ncaa.org/ 
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football classification.296  The remaining twenty-one original schools 
fall into Division III.  Interestingly, none of the original members of 
the NCAA or the FRC are represented in the middle position of 
Division II.  Of the members of the FRC, all except the University of 
Chicago (Division III) have Division I programs, and the U.S. Naval 
Academy’s football program is further classified in the most 
competitive I-A subdivision.297 
IX.  REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST AND A CALL FOR A NEW AMATEURISM 
Chancellor McCracken died in 1918, well before the NCAA 
celebrated its twenty-fifth birthday.298  Walter Camp passed in 
1925.299  But before his passing, each surely knew he had been a part 
of a major undertaking. 
What would the early leaders of the NCAA think of 
intercollegiate athletics and the NCAA today?  The founders would 
likely be very proud to see that their dream of a nationally-recognized 
NCAA has become a reality.  Virtually every four-year college in the 
country is now a member.  By legislating the terms of the eligibility 
for intercollegiate sport, NCAA regulations reach not only more than 
360,000 current collegiate student-athletes, but also prospective 
student athletes.  It sponsors eighty-eight national championships in 
twenty-three sports with men’s and women’s divisions in most of 
them.  It also is a leading promulgator of amateur sports rules. 
The early effort to create a “central bureau of propaganda”300 
has evolved into a Washington, D.C. lobbying office, a 
media/publishing department and a General Counsel’s office.  The use 
 
 296. See List of Active NCAA Member Institutions, http://www.ncaa.org/conferences/ 
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of television, radio and the internet now allows the NCAA and its 
members to spread their messages to millions.301 
Most founders would be surprised that the doors of opportunity 
have been opened for women and minorities, although there is work 
still to be done.  Social changes would also likely stun many of them.  
Earlier ideas of unsportsmanlike conduct have yielded to more flexible 
views of player and fan behavior.  In stark contrast to the days of 
encouraging abstinence from alcohol and Prohibition, institutions now 
sponsor and profit from the sale of alcohol at games.  Scantily clad 
female cheerleaders and crowd histrionics would likely confound the 
founders. 
No doubt all founders would be pleased that physical fitness 
education and opportunities are now available to all students at all 
educational levels.  They would celebrate America’s continuing success 
in the Olympic Games.  Likely, they would not be surprised that 
different NCAA schools have gone different ways with their athletic 
programs.  Some, however, would be surprised that institutions with 
such divergent approaches still occupy the same body.  Amateurists 
firmly believed that amateurism and professionalism could not live 
together in the same house, and they would view many aspects of 
today’s programs as “professional” in nature. 
That point brings us to the most significant difference the 
founders would note. They would be surprised at what qualifies as an 
“amateur” program today, particularly in revenue-producing sports.  
Today, revenues from television and radio contracts for coverage of 
NCAA championships are mind-boggling.302  Most of that money is 
channeled back to Division I schools, which in turn pump it back into 
their athletic programs.  In 2005, the NCAA licensed twenty-eight 
 
 301. See Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36 (providing an overview of the 
NCAA’s work).    
 302. In 1999 the NCAA signed an 11-year, 6 billion-dollar-plus agreement with CBS 
Sports averaging 545 million per year for coverage of men’s basketball and other sports 
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Distribution Chart, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004 (noting distribution of more than 
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available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2003/20030929 
/div1/4020n12.html (noting distribution of more than $260,000,000 dollars); Press Release, 
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2006] THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 275 
 
post-season football “bowl” games.303  Those bowls, conducted largely 
through the holiday season, brought their participating conferences 
and teams millions.  “Corporate partners” pay millions for advertising 
rights and the opportunity to say that they are affiliated with the 
NCAA, conferences, and member schools.  Athletic apparel 
manufacturers do the same.  Conferences and powerhouse schools also 
negotiate their own television, radio, and marketing contracts.304  At 
every level, the “property” of intercollegiate athletics that is for sale is 
not merely the games, but also the student-athletes themselves.  They 
are shuttled to and from coach’s shows and media circuses.305  Calls 
for institutions to cease requiring student athletes to sport the labels 
of corporate sponsors on their uniforms have fallen on deaf ears. 306  
Multi-million dollar media contracts for the coverage of games and 
championships would astound early amateurists.307  They would view 
such contracts as sacrilegious profiteering. 
Courts across the country fondly refer to amateurism as a 
“tradition.”  In 1984, in NCAA v. Board of Regents the U.S. Supreme 
Court referenced “a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports,” 
and said the NCAA plays a “critical” role in maintaining that 
tradition. 308  But a “tradition” is a pattern or practice that doesn’t 
change dramatically over time.309  This look at the NCAA’s first 
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quarter of a century shows that the amateurism of the NCAA’s 
inception is starkly different from what intercollegiate athletics offers 
now. 
A.  A New Amateurism 
Today it is too often forgotten that, historically, “amateur” was 
meant to define not merely how the student-athlete approached 
athletics, but also how a school conducted its intercollegiate athletics 
programs.  It was considered wrong—and a sign of professionalism—
to use student-athletes for advertising purposes.  Amateurists 
abhorred any funding structure for athletics that subjected the 
institution’s programs to outside control.  They would frown upon 
stadium luxury boxes, extensive post-season play, institutions inviting 
media coverage of their games and students, or corporate sponsorships 
in exchange for financial gain. 
A far different reality prevails today than in the period from 
1906-1931.  The overwhelming number of NCAA programs—certainly 
most in Divisions I and II—could never pass the litmus tests for 
amateurism found in Angell’s 1918 “Confession of Faith.”310  That new 
reality requires a reassessment of the role of amateurism in our legal 
treatment of intercollegiate athletics.  It requires “a new amateurism.” 
Defining the new amateurism requires the unraveling of three 
ideas that have become a tangled mush in recent decades: (1) 
amateurism, (2) education, and (3) intercollegiate athletics.  
Historically, amateurism was a principle that stood apart from 
education.  Indeed, educational institutions did not recognize athletics 
activities as being a part of their mission.  Campus athletics first 
emerged as mere student games.  Amateurism was a way of life, and 
even a person who was not in school could be an amateur. 
Institutions took control of athletics away from students 
because they feared that their students were not adhering to the 
amateur spirit; because they feared that athletics might overtake the 
college campus; because they had safety concerns; and, cynics might 
say, because they saw a golden financial opportunity.  Thus, the 
relationship between amateurism in athletics on the one hand and 
education on the other was born.  Educators who supported 
intercollegiate athletics then decided that, to control athletics, they 
had to ensure that athletic programs were integrated into their 
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educational programs.  That integration was not necessary for 
amateurism; it existed in many non-educational environments.  
Instead, integration was deemed necessary by those who wanted 
amateur athletics to continue in an educational environment.  
Significantly, institutions absolutely did not want the private sector to 
take over athletics, particularly after they had committed to millions 
in debt or come to rely upon the lucrative receipts of their programs. 
As discussed, the institutions, and the NCAA itself, faced 
internal struggles.  The promised integration never  occurred because 
of opposition within the institution to recognizing athletics and 
funding it in the general budget.  Essentially, what resulted was a 
bifurcated university wherein athletics was left to find its own 
funding, and coaches were left to fashion their own means of job 
security.311 
The third concept that needs unraveling is “intercollegiate 
athletics.”  Intercollegiate athletics is merely competition between 
collegiate institutions; the inadvertent result of the student-run 
games, later taken over by the colleges and universities.  
Intercollegiate athletics are not inherently either amateur or 
educational. They may, in fact, be run in a professional and/or non-
educational manner. 312 
Confusion of these three terms—or a merging of them, really—
has led courts to offer muddled guidance in cases involving challenges 
to intercollegiate athletics.  An example of this confusion is found in 
the Supreme Court’s famous decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents.  
That case revolved around a television plan adopted by the NCAA in 
the 1950’s, which essentially required NCAA schools to jointly 
negotiate contracts for television coverage.  One of the many goals of 
the plan was to ensure that smaller schools that could not command 
their own contracts got a piece of the pie.  Another was to exercise 
controls on television broadcasts to avoid feared drops in attendance. 
Schools with larger programs (and the power to negotiate on 
their own) resisted the plan and brought an action claiming that the 
plan violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, because it restrained the 
rights of schools to offer their product and consumers to buy it.  The 
 
 311. See discussion supra Part II.C-E; Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 
882-89 (discussing the bifurcated institution). 
 312. Thus, more than a few have suggested that so called “big time” athletic 
programs should be spun off into what is effectively a minor league or semi-professional 
program.  See discussion infra Part IX.C (describing Division I’s plan to separate from the 
NCAA). 
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Supreme Court agreed.  After noting the “critical role” that the NCAA 
plays in the maintenance of “a revered tradition of amateurism in 
college sports,” 313 the court’s opinion then muddied the waters by 
merging the notions of amateurism, education and intercollegiate 
athletics. 
 There can be no question but that [the NCAA] needs ample latitude to play [its] 
role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds 
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with 
the goals of the Sherman Act. But consistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the 
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that restrict 
output are hardly consistent with this role. Today we hold only that the record 
supports the District Court’s conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the 
ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has 
restricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the 
Nation’s life.314 
The final paragraph of the opinion began with a reference to “a 
revered tradition of amateurism.”315  It then said that “the role of the 
NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise die.”316  It 
concluded that “rules that restrict output” would not be “consistent 
with this role,” and that the NCAA has “restricted rather than 
enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life”.317  
What is the “tradition” the court is referencing?  A tradition of 
amateurism?  A tradition of intercollegiate athletics?  A tradition of 
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education? 318  Here, in 
speaking of tradition, the court merges the concepts of amateurism, 
education and intercollegiate athletics, treating them as if they are 
essentially the same thing.  Historically they were not, and they are 
not now.  Moreover, contrary to traditional amateurism, the court 
seemed to look outside the institution—speaking of the role of 
intercollegiate athletics “in the Nation’s life” and the right of 
consumer access to the product—rather than focusing upon the role of 
intercollegiate athletics inside respective institutions, or even among 
them. 
 
 313. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 120. 
 316. Id.  
 317. Id. (emphasis added). 
 318. See, e.g., Gary Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. 
REV. 2631, 2635 n.12 (1996) (pointing out how the Court failed to identify any particular 
rules that it considered to promote amateurism or academic values but merely assumed 
these traits). 
 
  
2006] THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 279 
 
Early amateurists would say that an amateur program should 
be assessed by its relevance to the undergraduate student body, not to 
outsiders.  Indirectly, the public would benefit from this internal focus 
because, according to amateurists, this focus preserved the 
educational mission.  The problem may be that the court embraces a 
narrow view of amateurism, one that does not address institutional 
commercialism, but rather one that focuses primarily on rules that 
keep the student athlete an integral part of the institution.319  Thus, it 
seems, while the Supreme Court used the language of amateurism to 
describe the NCAA’s role, the court actually ended up treating big-
time intercollegiate athletics as if they were a professional or semi-
professional programs. 
The dissent in Board of Regents recognized this latter point, 
complaining that the majority erred “in treating intercollegiate 
athletics under the NCAA’s control as a purely commercial venture in 
which colleges and universities participate solely, or even primarily, in 
the pursuit of profits.”320  Chastising the majority for failing to note 
the non-economic benefits of the plan, the dissent said, “the plan 
fosters the goal of amateurism by spreading revenues among various 
schools and reducing the financial incentives toward 
professionalism.”321 
The problem with the dissent’s point of view is that traditional 
amateurism does not embrace spreading commercial wealth from 
television contracts, because it rejects the very notion of such lucrative 
television contracts in the first place.  Moreover, the wealth gained 
from such contracts is not today used, in any significant measure, to 
promote traditional academic programs for the larger student body.  
Instead, most of that wealth goes back into those schools’ athletic 
 
 319. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 120.  No doubt the court was lured into this thinking by the 
NCAA’s own statement of its fundamental policy and its principle of amateurism. That 
fundamental policy states: 
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a 
vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to 
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program 
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a 
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports. 
NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.1, in 2005-2006 DIVISION I MANUAL, at 1, available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2005-06/ 
200506_d1_manual.pdf [hereinafter DIVISION I MANUAL].  However, as I have argued 
elsewhere, even that statement has changed over the years.  See Carter, Student Athlete, 
supra note 36, at 70-71. 
 320. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 121 (White, J., dissenting). 
 321. Id. at 135. 
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programs to fund more stadiums, higher paid coaches and more 
commercialism.  Even that portion of the money that goes to academic 
enhancement programs benefits student-athletes, not the general 
student body.  It even could be argued that student athletes are in 
need of such programs primarily because the rigorous schedule of 
intercollegiate athletics does not allow them to be ordinary 
students,322 or that such athlete-only programs are a poor substitute 
for the learning that can come through the diversity presented in 
general student body settings.  Traditional amateurism’s theory of 
“give everyone a chance” cannot be imported properly to justify the 
spreading of wealth generated by commercial activities in 
intercollegiate athletics that are themselves inconsistent with 
amateurism.  So the outcome of Board of Regents was right; the 
reasoning was wrong. 
In case after case, courts and lawmakers have put a thumb on 
the scale for intercollegiate athletics and its regulators on the ground 
that intercollegiate athletics is deemed “amateur” or “educational.”  
Thus, it is important to ask, “What are the contours of modern 
amateurism?”  What does an “educational” intercollegiate athletics 
program look like?  The complete answer would surely require another 
article, but some essentials come to mind. 
First, historically, amateurism defined not merely student 
behavior, but also how an institution was to run its program.  
Increasingly, however, the applicability of amateurism’s tenets to 
program operations in intercollegiate athletics seems to be forgotten.  
Too often, amateurism is deemed accomplished when a program 
emphasizes academic requirements and “no pay for play” for student-
athletes.  Historically, amateurism was far more than that. 323 
 
 322. See, e.g., Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 20. 
 323. The NCAA’s Constitution now has sixteen specific principles for the conduct of 
intercollegiate athletics.  “The Principle of Amateurism,” focuses primarily on shaping the 
student’s motivation to play sports and refers to protecting the student athlete from 
commercial exploitation.  It thus follows the old in loco parentis model by assuming that 
that exploitation will come from outside.  The principle states:  
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their 
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, 
mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate 
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from 
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.  
NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2.9, in DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 319.  Similarly, the NCAA 
constitution uses the term “amateurism” in connection with eligibility rules.  See id.  art. 1, 
§ 1.2.  While the NCAA has many principles relating to how the institution should conduct 
its intercollegiate athletic programs, they are not described in terms of amateurism. 
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A proper yardstick for modern amateurism would focus on 
program and policies beyond academics and eligibility, ensuring that 
the motivation for all policies are consistent with amateurism.  
Indeed, an institution may have an amateur approach with respect to 
one matter and a professional approach with respect to another 
matter.  For example, an institution may impose academic standards 
on student-athletes because it has the political power to do so.  At the 
same time, that institution could require student-athletes to engage in 
substantial seasonal, vacation and postseason practice and play; 
require the student-athlete to sport favored athletic apparel; trot the 
student-athlete out to the media; fail to satisfy the student-athlete’s 
full financial need because of concerns of competitive parity; and, in 
the process, reap millions.  Academic standards are consistent with 
amateurism because they advance an interest in keeping the athlete 
integrated into the student body, and, thus, athletics remains an 
avocation as required under an amateur model.  However, post-season 
or vacation play are hard to fit into athletics as an avocation model.  
Athletics policies that merely promote parity and ignore student 
athlete need, or that are driven by the commercial value of the sport to 
those administering it also are inconsistent with an amateurism 
model. 
For these reasons, in this highly commercial environment of 
intercollegiate athletics, before putting a thumb on the scales, courts 
must insist that amateurism flow throughout the program.  When 
individual policies are challenged, they must determine that those 
particular policies have an amateurism motivation.  In other words, 
professional programs should not be able to piggyback on amateur 
policies or a tradition of amateurism that they do not embrace. 
Second, an amateur program must have limits on 
commercialism.  Unlike the days of the early NCAA, educational 
institutions today regularly engage in commercial activity that is not 
directly related to the educational mission.324  For example, they own 
 
 324. The operation of intercollegiate athletics programs, particularly the post-season 
bowls, has raised interesting issues of whether the operations should be subject to the 
unrelated business income tax.  Exempt organizations may be subject to tax on income 
derived from operations not directly related to their exempt purpose.  Congress has saved 
post-season intercollegiate athletics for now, but the debate is ongoing.  A new vision of 
amateurism is very relevant to that discussion.  See, e.g., Eric Guruli, Commerciality of 
College Sports:  Should the IRS Intercept?, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 43 (2005); Richard L. Kaplan, 
Intercollegiate Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430 
(1980); James L. Musselmann, Recent Tax Issues Regarding Professional and Amateur 
Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195 (2003). 
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commercial real estate and rent it to the general public.  They rent 
their campus buildings to outsiders for a fee.  But those activities 
differ in two important respects from intercollegiate athletics.  First, 
the income from such activities generally is available to the institution 
as a whole and supports further broad educational endeavors.  Second, 
those transactions tend to sell only physical property.  Intercollegiate 
athletics, under an umbrella of amateurism, puts the intellectual 
assets of an institution—its students and teachers—up for sale. 
For this reason, rank commercialism in the guise of amateur 
athletics is particularly dangerous.  Commercialism should be strictly 
limited in amateur programs run by educational institutions, 
primarily because commercialism creates a dangerous conflict of 
interest between student and institution.  Thus, the author’s beef with 
the NCAA in Board of Regents: the NCAA merely sought to cut the 
commercial pie into more slices, not to require schools to push away 
from the table.  Amateur programs impose significant limits on 
student-athlete rights under the theory that the institution will 
protect the welfare of the athlete.  On that same theory, courts and 
lawmakers have granted schools leeway and upheld restrictions on 
student-athlete behavior.  If an institution is to take full advantage of 
commercialism, there is really no reason why student athletes should 
not be paid to play or even why they should not be represented by 
unions.  Indeed, an argument could be made that it is necessary that 
they have outside representation, given the conflicted nature of the 
institution.325 
Another important aspect of a modern amateur model in the 
context of education is the integration of intercollegiate athletics and 
the student-athlete into the fabric of the institution.  Where programs 
are concerned, the most significant difficulty here is financial 
integration. Today, financial integration of intercollegiate athletics 
programs is allegedly accomplished by requiring institutional CEO’s to 
be responsible for budget approval and expenditures, and requiring 
that athletics be subject to the “normal” budgetary operations of the 
college or university.326  That is not enough.  It should mean that 
 
 325. See generally Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22 (arguing for a nonprofit 
organization to represent student athletes). 
 326. See, e.g., NCAA CONST. art. 6, § 6.2, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 319 
(requiring CEOs to approve budget, requiring athletics to be subject to institution’s 
“normal” budgeting procedures, and requiring independent auditor.); see also id. art. 12, § 
12.6.1.4 (allowing institution to receive money from professional sports organization for 
support of general fund, general scholarship fund, or as part of a “reciprocal marketing 
relationship”). 
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institutional budgets reflect athletic income and expenditures, along 
with other income and expenditures.  Moreover, financial integration 
should mean that some significant portion of the income from 
intercollegiate athletics goes to support general institutional 
operations.  This is the minimum gift that intercollegiate athletics can 
make to institutions that support it; by allowing it to use its name and 
goodwill, its grounds, its buildings, its students, its administrative 
structure, its security apparatus, and, indeed, by guaranteeing its 
debts. 
Integration also means integration of the student-athlete into 
the general student body.  Of course, it means the athlete should be 
required to satisfy minimum academic standards.  But it also means 
that the time commitment required by athletics—practice, playing and 
travel—should be such that the goal of academic success, not just 
minimum success, can reasonably be achieved.  It means that playing 
and practice seasons should not extend significantly beyond the 
academic year.  As discussed elsewhere, in contrast to the dominant 
image of student-athletes as privileged, in fact, student-athletes stood 
on the fringes of the revolution in rights that affected most in the 
general student body after the Vietnam War.  In big time programs, 
they exist apart, in one side of a bifurcated institution, subject to the 
whims of a small group of individuals with the power to determine 
their futures.327  The NCAA has rightly given attention to ensuring 
that institutions conform to academic standards in student athlete 
admissions.  However, there is far more.  Vestiges of the broken stool 
of in loco parentis328 still place student-athletes in precarious 
positions, where policies applicable to them are a function of their 
commercial value to the program, rather than a function of 
amateurism and educational considerations.  Grievance procedures 
available to the student-athlete are not the same as those afforded the 
 
 327. See, e.g., Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 879-82. 
 328. I have elsewhere described in loco parentis as a three legged stool: (1) control; 
(2) student welfare; and (3) judicial and legislative deference.  See id. at 859. 
The control leg permitted the institution to place broad controls on student 
behavior. . . . Balancing the control leg was the welfare leg. It provided 
justification for the controls by positing that the controls were needed to protect 
the student’s welfare . . . . Of course, conceptions of student welfare were 
controlled by the assumption that students were infants with no independent 
rights. . . .  Finally, the deference leg gave the doctrine its teeth . . . . 
Id.  I have argued that the student welfare leg of that stool has been broken, creating an 
imbalance.  See id. 891-92.  Despite the demise of in loco parentis in matters involving the 
general student body, it continues in a perverted fashion in matters involving student 
athletes. Id.  
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ordinary student.  Still, institutions extract professional commitments 
from student-athletes under the guise of amateurism. 
That brings us to another important aspect of an amateur 
program in the context of education.  Such a program protects the 
welfare of its student-athletes. Here again, commercialism is key.  
Commercialism places the institution at odds with the student-
athlete, often leading the institution to choose pay-dirt over student 
athlete needs.  As stated elsewhere, 
 [T]he alleged parent (the institution) continues to exercise broad controls over 
the child (the student athlete) and yet the parent is unable to fulfill its 
responsibilities in protecting the welfare of the alleged child because the parent 
has an overwhelming financial interest in exploiting the child’s talents.  Indeed, 
like the greedy parents of a financially-valuable child actor, institutions have 
consistently pushed their charges onto more and more national stages in pursuit of 
greater and greater financial returns, all the while insisting that their charges 
cannot handle greater independence.329 
Finally, an amateur intercollegiate athletics program in the 
context of education should be transparent.  The legal benefits athletic 
programs gain from the amateur label are a gift from the public.  No 
group should be allowed to insist on these benefits and also insist that 
its operations be closeted from the public.  The only way to unspin the 
spin of a bureau of propaganda is to have information on how it 
operates and what factors went into decisions. 
Fashioning a new amateurism that focuses upon the 
motivation behind policies should not be overly burdensome to the 
court.  Indeed, investigation into the purposes behind policies occurs 
now.  In Board of Regents, the lawyers and the court did substantial 
investigation into the reasoning behind the television plan at issue.  
But the court should  have assessed whether or not the television plan 
promoted amateurism.  I have suggested that it did not.  The mere 
promotion of intercollegiate athletics competition without more should 
not justify special treatment historically afforded to amateur 
programs. 
B.  Is Amateurism Outdated? 
Is “amateurism” an outdated concept?  Today Olympic athletes 
have corporate sponsors who support their training.  Athletic 
scholarships are, essentially, pay for play, although some might argue 
not enough.  Student-athletes at NCAA schools may keep the cash 
prizes they receive for medaling at the Olympic games.  Student-
 
 329. Carter, In Loco Parentis, supra note 22, at 853. 
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athletes may be a professional in one sport, but an amateur in 
another, although their right to income from professional activity is 
limited.330  Intercollegiate athletics programs make millions upon 
millions, and the public cannot seem to get enough. 
Clearly too, some of the social assumptions that supported 
traditional amateurism are outdated. Consider, for example, historical 
objections to athletically-based financial aid including scholarships 
and meals.  Certainly, opponents feared that such “pay” would affect 
the athlete’s approach to the game, and they feared that outsiders who 
provided such scholarships would then have the power to determine 
the course of the institution.  But there were at least four other social 
objections driving the opposition to athletically-related aid in those 
days.  First, many believed that the only appropriate basis for 
scholarships was superior academic performance in a liberal arts 
program.331  They opposed scholarships based upon any other ground, 
including need.  Today, while minimum academic standards apply, 
scholarships are offered on a whole host of grounds.  Second, as 
discussed earlier, professionalism—even outside of the college or 
university—was viewed as a social evil to be eradicated, thus, the 
slightest movement away from pure amateurism was deemed 
offensive.  Today, while society still seems to wish to respect the line 
between amateurism and professionalism, society’s view of 
professionalism is more measured.  Thus, social mores today don’t 
justify a flat out opposition to athletically-related aid on 
professionalism grounds.  Third, some amateurists had biases against 
the lower classes that were more likely to pay for play because they 
had financial need.332  Modern society rejects such class biases as a 
basis for policy.  Fourth, some opposed intercollegiate athletics in 
general, and thus, athletically-related aid, for they knew that without 
such aid, intercollegiate athletics could not grow.  Today, society has 
fully embraced intercollegiate athletics, properly conducted, as a social 
good. 
On the other hand, athletically-related aid in today’s highly 
commercial context raises new problems.  As the Knight Commission 
has noted, there is a potential for a negative dynamic between 
 
 330. NCAA CONST. art. 12, § 12.1.1.1.4.3.1-2, in DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 319 
(stating that a student-athlete may accept “Operation Gold” grant from U.S. Olympic 
Committee); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (restricting endorsement 
opportunities of student athlete who was a professional in one sport and an amateur in 
another). 
 331. W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 73-74 (1997). 
 332. See text accompanying note 101. 
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student-athlete and coach when the student is so dependent upon the 
coach for the continuance of his or her education.  Moreover, if the 
continuance of a scholarship is based upon student athletic 
performance, there is reason to fear that the student-athlete will be 
inclined to put athletics first.  For this reason, the Commission and 
others have urged needs-based scholarships in amateur programs.333 
It certainly seems right that in a new amateurism model, 
student-athletes who can qualify based on need should receive at least 
a substantial portion of their financial aid on that basis.  One could 
imagine a more generous needs test for those playing intercollegiate 
athletics, given the fact that, by virtue of their commitment, student-
athletes have far less time for outside work than other students.  
However, athletic performance as one of several bases for aid is not 
wholly objectionable, given that institutions now allow aid based upon 
a wide range of issues, including the mere fact that the donor and the 
recipient are from the same state.  The problem lies in how such aid is 
determined and delivered.  Too often professionalism has crept into 
financial aid issues as student-athlete financial aid has gotten tangled 
up with issues of competitive parity.  For example, School X wanted 
restrictions on scholarships so that School Y could not outbid it for 
student-athletes.  In the midst of these arguments, student-athletes 
with need suffered.  But it seems that athletics as a basis for 
scholarships is not wholly objectionable in a modern scheme, so long 
as the source of the funding is under the control of the CEO, and an 
objective method of distributing the scholarships can be found.334 
Those who claim that big-time intercollegiate athletics are still 
“amateur” athletics will no doubt assert that athletics is itself 
educational.  But as argued earlier, athletics is not inherently 
educational, no more than requiring students to wash a professor’s car 
once a week is inherently educational.  Students will derive physical 
benefits from both exercises.  In both cases, they will learn a skill that 
theoretically could some day earn them money.  Like athletics, group 
car washing takes teamwork.  But these attributes, without more, do 
not make athletics or car washing an education.  Athletics is only 
educational if it is conducted in an educational way, in an educational 
context with educational standards.  Post-season bowl games that 
teach student-athletes that practicing and playing during holidays is 
more important than time with family at home are of questionable 
 
 333. See Knight Commission, supra note 306. 
 334. One option might be to make all athletically based aid the same dollar amount 
for all student-athletes who do not meet a need-based, academic or other test. 
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educational value.335  Lessons are no doubt learned, but they are not 
the ones educational institutions should be teaching. 
C.  The Future of Intercollegiate Athletics: Amateurism or 
Professionalism? 
Early, amateurists felt that professionalism and amateurism 
could not live in the same house.336  Yet, in intercollegiate athletics 
today professional and amateur approaches essentially share the same 
living space.  Certainly, the Restructuring that occurred in 1996 and 
1997 has altered the landscape a bit.  But Restructuring was triggered 
by a threat from Division I institutions that they leave the NCAA if 
they were not given more autonomy to determine their own programs, 
and to exploit their commercial potential and the benefit of the 
revenues that their programs produced.337  But as discussed 
elsewhere, Restructuring put amateurism at greater risk than before, 
because it allowed rank commercialism and professionalism to exist 
openly, even as those administering such professional programs 
reaped the legal benefits of an amateur program classification.  
Essentially, to save its body, the NCAA had to sell its soul.338 
Likely, we have today some programs that could still pass a 
modern test as an amateur program in an educational context.  The 
obvious place to look is Division III. But the truth is that what we 
have in America today are three types of professional programs: major 
league professional, minor league professional and collegiate league 
 
 335. In the 2005 holiday season, many teams chose to take their student athletes on 
the road to prepare for prestigious bowl games rather than having them spend time at 
home with families.  Families are sometimes quieted by perks that allow them to come 
along and the belief that such trips are necessary for their son to secure a professional 
sports career.   Potentially negative press is staved off by photo shoots showing student-
athletes participate in some charity event. See, e.g., Elton Alexander, Getsy glad he’s not 
home for Christmas; Akron QB happy to be in Motor City, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 
20, 2005, at D1; Furman Bisher, College athletics has found financial trough, lost its way, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 14, 2005, at B2 (noting earlier resistance to bowl games on 
Christmas day gave way to desires for financial gain). 
 336. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 337. See Carter, Student Athlete, supra note 36, at 49-51, 50 n.164 (discussing 
Division I’s threat to leave if it did not receive more autonomy). 
 338. Id. at 49-51; see also Knight Commission, supra note 306 (expressing fear that 
more and more colleges are moving toward commercialism and a professional model) (last 
visited March 21, 2006); Gary T. Brown, Members Reflect on Efforts to Federate Governance 
10 Years Ago, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006. 
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professional.339  Some commentators have suggested that these big 
time programs, at least Division I-A football and Division I basketball, 
should spin off and separate from their universities.  The plans range 
from those in which the university maintains control to those in which 
they do not.  The Knight Commission has strongly opposed such spin-
offs, arguing that the result will be unsportsmanlike and unethical 
conduct, and a loss of academic integrity.340  Instead, they have 
suggested that the NFL and NBA create a minor league for those who 
do not want to go to college.  But why would the professionals do that 
when a minor league is provided for free?341 
A partial spin-off from educational institutions, with the 
benefits of still claiming amateur status and an educational mission, 
would greatly exacerbate the existing problems, allowing even greater 
commercialism and more unmonitored exploitation of student-
atheletes and educational resources.  On the other hand, if there is a 
corporate separation of the big league collegiate programs from their 
educational institutions—even in a parent-subsidiary sense but with a 
separate board and rules to respect the corporate veil—the true cost of 
athletics would then be realized.  These new entities supervising 
intercollegiate athletics would have to compensate the universities for 
the services that intercollegiate athletics now take for granted; 
including, first and foremost, the use of the university name, but also 
the use of space, security, and other assets previously mentioned.  
That compensation would flow to the general student body. 
Such a separation would remove the guise of amateurism.  
There would then be no objection to unions for student-athletes to 
represent players and negotiate adequate pay and workplace 
conditions.  Playing rules could require students to carry at least a 
minimum number of hours at the institution and limit the time 
allowed to achieve a degree.  Because the entities would be corporately 
separated from the university, they would have fewer opportunities to 
pressure institutions into academic compromises.  Some might 
initially object to an institution blatantly renting out its name, but 
then, that is exactly what is occurring today in corporate sponsorship 
and advertising deals. 
 
 339. I must leave to another day the broader implications of this conclusion, but the 
claim that college sports are professional has been made by many commentators before, 
although perhaps not in this way. 
 340. See, Knight Commission, supra note 306. 
 341. See, e.g., id. 
 
  
2006] THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 289 
 
Whatever the ultimate model, while the NCAA and its member 
schools can help with this process of defining the new amateurism, 
they cannot be its sole architects.  While they bring a wealth of 
knowledge to the table, their commercial investment in athletics also 
creates inevitable conflicts of interest. 
One question remains: what would have happened had the 
NCAA and its member schools taken a different road?  For example, 
suppose they had decided to withdraw from management of 
intercollegiate contests and focus solely on intramural or interclass 
games, just as McCracken wanted.  Suppose they had continued 
intercollegiate athletics, but rejected lucrative corporate deals that go 
along with it.  Or suppose they had limited game schedules by both 
distance and number of games, and rejected postseason play?  Could 
they have done this?  The theoretical answer is yes.  The practical 
answer is more difficult to provide.  Although some institutions did 
pull back, presidents were under a great deal of pressure to support 
the growth of intercollegiate athletics or at least tolerate it. 
Had they been able to withdraw completely, or even 
significantly, it is clear that private enterprise would have filled that 
gap in the form of minor league programs.342  Intercollegiate athletics 
would still have existed, but likely on a more modest and much less 
highly commercialized level.  Indeed, it seems  that the reason that 
baseball could develop its own minor league, despite a college game, 
was precisely because, in contrast to basketball and football, baseball 
was well established professionally and in the public’s mind before the 
time the college game came around. 
Would the McCracken model or a toned-down amateur model 
for “big time” athletics have really been so bad?  While some might 
argue that without athletics, institutions would have lost out on 
lucrative financial opportunities, the truth is that they would also 
have lost out on crippling athletic expenses and troubling ethical 
dilemmas, as well.  Coaches’ salaries, equipment and insurance costs, 
and new stadiums are among the items that would likely not have 
such high price tags.  Conflicts of interest between school and student 
athlete also would have been lessened, as would public pressure to 
look aside as academic standards were jeopardized in favor of athletic 
success.  It might even be argued that without the commercial 
 
 342. The Knight Commission has called upon the NBA and NFL to form professional 
minor leagues.  Id.  The idea proffered is that persons uninterested in study could pursue 
those options.  Id. 
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pressures presented by the current model, institutions would provide 
a better education to their student-athletes. 
What of the so-called advertising and financial benefits of the 
game?  Recent studies confirm the doubts James Angell expressed in 
1918 about the so-called advertising value of athletics.  They show 
that big athletic programs do not translate into higher yields for non-
athletic programs at the same institution or an increase in the quality 
of the student body.343 One could imagine that schools could require 
that a significant percentage of any targeted athletic gift and all 
athletics income go into a non-athletically-related general fund, but 
they have not done so.  At most, they have gently encouraged athletic 
donors to support other programs.  It could be argued that if students 
are selecting institutions solely because of their athletics programs, 
perhaps such an advertising benefit is not well deserved anyway.  
Finally, the suggestion that team spirit requires commercialism is 
contrary to the traditional amateurist’s argument that commercialism 
would undercut team spirit. 
Chancellor McCracken, and others who supported him in 
calling that December 1905 meeting, were bold, but they were also 
naive.  They believed that educators could take over intercollegiate 
athletics and restore them to a higher moral plane. They believed 
educators would do this because educators themselves stood on a 
higher moral plane.  Educators had a higher calling than mere 
financial gain; educators celebrated learning and would insist that it 
be central to any enterprise their institutions undertook.  But the 
educators who gathered in New York City that winter were merely 
men.  In the midst of pressure from students, alumni, and the public—
under the heat of the media’s glare—some fled to the ivory tower.  
Others sold their caps and gowns to the highest bidder.  Only a 
courageous few remained, and still remain, to fight. 
History reveals that the hopes and dreams of these founders 
were greater than the will of the educators who engendered their 
 
 343. Indeed, independent studies commissioned by the NCAA demonstrate that 
schools that increase their athletic programs end up with reductions in their general 
budgets.  See generally Johnathan M. Orszag and Peter R. Orszag, The Empirical Effects of 
Collegiate Athletics: An Interim Report (2003), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library 
/research/athletic_spending/2003/empirical_effects_of_collegiate_athletics_interim_report.p
df; Johnathan M. Orszag and Peter R. Orszag, The Physical Capital Stock Used in 
Collegiate Athletics (2005), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/ 
athletic_spending/2005/physical_capital_stock_used_in_collegiate_athletics.pdf.  The same 
view is taken in a Knight Commission Study.  See generally Robert H. Frank, Challenging 
the Myth: A Review of the Links Between College Athletic Success, Student Quality, and 
Donations (2004), http://www.knightcommission.org/about/frank_report/. 
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faith.  The first twenty-five years of the NCAA was an age of 
controversy.  The first twenty five years of the NCAA was an age of 
patriotism.  And, because the founders truly believed that most 
educators would stand down and choose education over 
commercialism, the first twenty-five years of the NCAA was also an 
age of innocence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
